New info about Russian interference 1/12/2026
Executive summary
New reporting around January 12, 2026, does not reveal a single dramatic new revelation about Kremlin-directed political interference campaigns but does show a pattern of expanded kinetic and hybrid tools—new long‑range strike drones, intensified missile and drone barrages on Ukraine, and sustained covert/psychological operations in Europe—that together signal Moscow’s increasingly integrated use of military power and information operations (ISW; Reuters) [1] [2] [3]. Analysts caution that many claims remain attributionally ambiguous and come through sources with operational or political incentives, which requires careful parsing of motive and evidence [4] [3].
1. What the January 12 ISW update adds to the picture: more operational detail, not a new doctrine
The Institute for the Study of War’s January 12 assessment documents continued Russian offensive activity in northern Kharkiv Oblast (Velykyi Burluk direction) and underscores operational friction—Russian units conducting assaults but often failing to advance—while also highlighting domestic economic strains from prioritizing the defense industrial base [5]. The report contains granular battlefield reporting and economic context rather than announcing a novel Moscow interference playbook; it situates military pressure and domestic policy choices as mutually reinforcing elements of Russia’s war effort [5].
2. New and evolving strike tools: Geran‑5 and broader strike trends
Independent reporting compiled by ISW notes that Russian forces have fielded a new long‑range Geran‑5 strike drone, reportedly derived from an Iranian interceptor design with roughly a 90‑kilogram warhead and a stated range near 1,000 km, which Ukrainian intelligence attributed to strikes between January 1–11 [1]. Parallel reporting describes intensified combined drone and missile strikes—including what Reuters called the year’s most concentrated barrage on January 12—that killed and injured civilians and damaged Ukrainian infrastructure, indicating Moscow’s continued reliance on long‑range airborne strikes to project power [1] [2].
3. Hybrid operations in Europe: “Phase Zero,” covert attacks, and strategic signaling
ISW and related analysts continue to assess Russian use of “Phase Zero” measures—covert attacks and informational campaigns aimed at shaping Western political will and deterring further security guarantees for Ukraine—with specific reference to covert strikes and alleged sabotage against German infrastructure [3]. The Oreshnik IRBM strike against western Ukraine and Kremlin public narratives alleging Ukrainian attacks on Russian soil fit a pattern of reflexive control and strategic signaling intended to raise costs for Western support to Kyiv, though some Kremlin justifications have been contested by U.S. and Western reporting [4] [3].
4. Supporting moves and West response: materiel flows and asymmetric actions
Western responses and materiel developments appear alongside these Russian actions: Germany’s Rheinmetall delivery schedule for Lynx KF41 IFVs and UK work on a Nightfall SRBM concept, plus UK production of “Octopus” interceptor drones for Ukraine, show escalatory resourcing that Moscow likely views as catalytic to its hybrid campaign calculus [5] [6]. At the same time, maritime interdictions tied to sanction evasion (U.S. Coast Guard tanker seizures) and Ukrainian long‑range strikes on Russian energy and military depots reflect the conflict’s widening logistical and economic dimensions [7] [3].
5. Assessing credibility, motives, and the limits of current reporting
The new reporting mix combines Western open‑source intelligence, Ukrainian military claims, and Russian state narratives, each with inherent incentives: ISW synthesizes geolocated footage and partner reporting but flags unconfirmed milblogger claims; Russian official statements are often aimed at justifying strikes or rallying domestic support; Ukrainian denials counter Moscow’s narratives [1] [4] [5]. Where Western agencies (e.g., CIA reporting cited by analysts) have disputed Kremlin accounts—such as claims about attacks on Putin’s residence—analysts treat Russian explanations as part of a coercive messaging campaign rather than settled fact [4]. Reporting to January 12 therefore clarifies toolsets and tactical shifts but does not by itself prove a discrete new Kremlin interference doctrine beyond an intensified, multi‑domain application of existing hybrid tactics [5] [3].