What are the possible indicators and situation surrounding the new start treaty?

1. The hard deadline and what it removes

New START’s legally binding caps on deployed strategic warheads and deployed launchers , together with its on‑site inspection and data‑exchange regime, will lapse when the treaty expires in early February 2026, ending decades of verifiable U.S.–Russian limits unless a new arrangement is negotiated or parties agree to continue observing the limits by other means ^{[7] [8] [5]}.

2. Russia’s one‑year offer and its catch

In September 2025 President Vladimir Putin publicly proposed that both sides continue to observe New START numerical limits for one year after expiry, an offer Moscow frames as preserving stability but that Russia conditions on reciprocal acts and — according to Russian statements — could be reversed unless Washington takes steps Moscow deems de‑escalatory; the Kremlin also previously announced a suspension of treaty participation in 2023, halting inspections ^{[4] [9] [2]}.

3. Washington’s dilemma: trust, verification, and politics

U.S. officials and experts have signaled openness to discussions but face a credibility problem: New START’s verification mechanisms were valuable precisely because they were legally binding and included inspections; informal adherence without inspections would rely on intelligence assessments and political trust at a moment of intense mutual suspicion and domestic political pressure in Washington ^{[3] [6] [9]}.

4. Practical indicators to watch in the days and months around expiry

The most concrete signals will be (a) whether Moscow restores full verification provisions or keeps them suspended; (b) whether the United States and Russia issue joint statements committing to numerical limits or mutually exchange some data even without formal treaty text; and (c) any rapid technical changes—such as re‑uploading warheads onto missiles, reconverting non‑deployed launchers for deployment, or accelerating modernization programs—that would be observable to intelligence services and commentators ^{[9] [6] [3]}.

5. Strategic implications and escalation risks

Analysts warn that the lapse will remove transparent restraints and increase the risk of a renewed arms competition and destabilizing uncertainty, especially because New START did not cover China’s expanding forces and because the treaty’s monitoring dampened the chances of “break‑out” or surprise force buildups; the absence of an arrangement could also complicate the 2026 NPT Review Conference and broader non‑proliferation diplomacy ^{[10] [6] [11]}.

6. What continuation might look like and obstacles

Options short of a new treaty include a mutual, informal observance of numerical limits, limited transparency measures or data‑sharing, or multilateral frameworks that bring in other nuclear states — but New START’s text allows only one five‑year extension (already used) and cannot be extended again, making a legally binding renewal impossible and creating a narrow window for creative diplomatic fixes ^{[3] [6] [8]}.

7. Political narratives and competing agendas

Moscow’s public offer serves multiple purposes: it positions Russia as a stabilizer, pressures the U.S. to reciprocate, and gains diplomatic leverage ahead of global forums; inside the U.S., political actors have used the treaty’s fate to score points on national security or criticize past policies, a dynamic that complicates sober risk‑management and negotiation ^{[4] [5] [12]}.

8. Bottom line and monitoring checklist

The immediate indicators to monitor are formal Russian moves on verification, any U.S.–Russia joint communiqué or data exchange, visible changes to deployed forces, and statements by third parties (China, NATO allies) that could shift incentives; sources emphasize that absent restored inspections and a clear diplomatic pathway, the post‑New START world will be more opaque and risk‑prone ^{[9] [4] [5]}.