What did Nigel Farage say about Vladimir Putin in interviews or speeches since 2022?
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Executive summary
Nigel Farage repeatedly argued since 2022 that Western policies — particularly the eastward expansion of NATO and the EU — helped “provoke” Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while also saying he “disliked” Putin as a person but had previously “admired” him as a political operator; those remarks provoked widespread condemnation and sharp debate across UK politics and the media [1] [2] [3]. Farage has defended his stance as consistent realism rather than support for Putin, publishing a Telegraph piece and posting clarifications on X that the invasion was “immoral” while insisting Western mistakes mattered [4] [5] [1].
1. What Farage actually said about Putin and the invasion
Farage told BBC interviewer Nick Robinson that he had long warned the “ever eastward expansion” of NATO and the EU would give Putin “a reason…to say they’re coming for us again and to go to war,” and he reiterated that the expansion had “provoked” Russia’s 2022 invasion even as he said “of course” the war was Putin’s fault [3] [2]. He emphasised in later pieces and posts that the invasion was “immoral, outrageous and indefensible,” yet repeated the line “if you poke the Russian bear with a stick, don’t be surprised if he responds,” framing his comment as predictive analysis rather than apology for Moscow [4] [1].
2. Historic remarks resurfacing: admiration and being “an operator”
Journalists and opponents repeatedly pointed to Farage’s older comments that he “admired” Vladimir Putin as a political operator — a phrase he has defended by saying he “disliked him as a person” but respected Putin’s ability to “take control of running Russia” — comments originally made years earlier and cited back to him in 2024 interviews [3] [6] [7]. Media round‑ups have traced a pattern: Farage has contrasted personal dislike with tactical admiration and has repeatedly invoked his 2014 European Parliament interventions predicting conflict in Ukraine [8] [7].
3. The public and political backlash
Farage’s June 2024 remarks ignited cross‑party condemnation: former prime minister Boris Johnson accused him of “parroting Putin’s lies,” Rishi Sunak said the comments “play into Putin’s hands,” and senior Conservatives and Labour figures called the stance disgraceful or dangerous, with ex‑defence ministers deriding his analysis as simplistic or appeasing [9] [8] [1]. Media opinion pieces framed the comments as either reckless populism or a continuation of a long‑running Farage posture that courts controversy [10] [11].
4. Farage’s defence and his insistence he is not a Putin apologist
Facing criticism, Farage wrote in the Telegraph and posted on X to deny being an “apologist or supporter of Putin,” asserting that he had “seen the war coming” and arguing Western policy errors had consequences while reaffirming that the invasion itself was wrong [5] [4]. Supporters framed his stance as realist scepticism about NATO enlargement and sanctions; critics and several analysts countered that his framing echoes Kremlin narratives and can be used as propaganda, a claim Farage and his allies deny [12] [9].
5. How reporting and counterarguments shape the record
Contemporary reporting is consistent on the factual record of what Farage said: he blamed Western expansion for creating conditions for war, acknowledged Putin’s culpability for the invasion, and has repeatedly defended earlier praise of Putin as admiration for political skill rather than moral endorsement [1] [3] [6]. Opponents argue those formulations amplify Russian justifications and downplay agency; independent analysts quoted in outlets such as CNBC and Reuters have said Farage is “playing to Putin’s narrative” and that Moscow sought pretexts for aggression regardless of NATO trajectories [4] [1]. The sources do not provide evidence of Farage having operational ties to Russia, though critics treat his rhetoric as politically useful to pro‑Moscow messaging and opponents highlight the electoral and media gain he derives from controversy [12].