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Why is Nigeria’s north and centre plagued by overlapping insecurity? Is a part of it because of colonialism or neocolonialism?
Executive summary
Northern and central Nigeria face overlapping insecurity driven by multiple, interacting causes: Islamist insurgencies (Boko Haram/ISWAP) in the northeast, armed “bandits” and kidnappers in the northwest, and farmer–herder and communal violence in the central belt — all of which have displaced millions and disrupted food production and schools [1] [2] [3]. Commentators and analysts point both to immediate drivers — poverty, weak institutions, youth unemployment, climate shocks and a “profitable” ransom/illegal resource economy — and to deeper historical legacies including colonial border-making and post‑independence political‑economic arrangements often characterised as neocolonial; scholars differ on how directly those legacies translate into today’s violence [4] [5] [6] [7].
1. A tangled map of threats — multiple, overlapping violent actors
Nigeria’s insecurity is not one conflict but several that overlap geographically. Islamist insurgents (Boko Haram/ISWAP) have driven the long-running humanitarian crisis in the northeast, while banditry, mass kidnappings and emerging jihadist links plague the northwest; the central belt has deadly farmer–herder and communal clashes that now feed militia formation and vigilantism [1] [2] [8] [3]. International monitors report millions displaced and sharp interruptions to education and agriculture across these regions [2] [9].
2. Immediate drivers emphasised by Nigerian leaders and analysts
Political leaders, experts and opinion writers foreground short- and medium‑term drivers: poverty, high youth unemployment, neglect of education, and state failure to deliver security and services. Governors and former senior politicians have publicly linked insecurity to poverty and long‑term underinvestment in agriculture and schools, arguing that idle youth and weak livelihoods are fertile recruitment pools for criminal or extremist groups [4] [10] [5]. Humanitarian agencies cite the direct humanitarian impact: food insecurity in 2025 is linked to conflict, economic hardship and climate effects [9].
3. Economic dynamics: ransom, illegal economies and state capacity
Several pieces portray insecurity as an economic ecosystem: kidnappings and ransom, illicit mining and cattle rustling generate revenues that incentivise violence and sustain armed groups; meanwhile constrained state capacity and alleged corruption undermine effective policing and justice [5] [8] [11]. One commentator estimated large economic losses and argued insecurity is now a “profitable business” that erodes state legitimacy [5].
4. Climate and demographic pressures amplify local conflicts
Analysts link farmer–herder violence to competition over increasingly scarce grazing land and water, aggravated by climate change and demographic pressure on resources. Brookings and other research highlight how climate-driven shifts make long-standing pastoral routes more contested, turning disputes into armed clashes and contributing to displacement [12] [8].
5. The colonial and neocolonial argument — history matters, but scholars disagree on causality
Many scholars trace aspects of today’s insecurity to colonial-era decisions — boundary drawing, indirect rule and administrative structures that produced new ethnic and regional configurations — arguing these legacies shaped weak institutions and grievances [6] [13]. Broader critiques label post‑independence economic ties, debt, IMF/World Bank‑led policies and foreign corporate patterns as “neocolonial” forces that undercut sovereignty and development, creating structural conditions for instability [7] [14]. At the same time, some reappraisals caution against a single-factor colonial explanation and urge attention to contemporary governance failures and political choices [15]. In short: available reporting shows both lines of argument are advanced; authors disagree about how directly colonialism or neocolonialism causes current violence [6] [7] [15].
6. International intervention and politics: contested remedies and risks
Calls for foreign military or humanitarian intervention are contested. Some Nigerian voices and associations warn against inviting external military action, arguing root causes are “homegrown” and that past foreign interventions have had disastrous consequences; others seek international pressure or assistance to protect civilians [16] [17]. External actors’ involvement can shift incentives and politicise narratives [17] [18].
7. What this means for solutions: multi‑layered, locally grounded responses
Reporting converges on the need for multidimensional responses: strengthen state capacity for security and justice, invest in livelihoods (especially agriculture and education), support local reconciliation and reintegration programs for children and former fighters, and address economic drivers like ransom economies and illicit extraction [19] [4] [5]. Analysts and UN agencies underscore that humanitarian relief and peacebuilding must be coordinated with measures that rebuild food systems and restore access to services [9] [19].
Limitations: these conclusions are based on the provided sources; available reporting describes competing explanations — immediate governance and economic drivers and longer historical/structural legacies — and does not yield a single causal verdict tying insecurity directly to colonialism or neocolonialism alone [6] [7].