What did Geir Lundestad and other Nobel insiders say in later years about the decision to award Obama the prize?

1. Lundestad’s later framing: intended boost, disappointing outcome

In his memoir Secretary of Peace and in interviews around its publication, Lundestad said the committee deliberately hoped the prize would help strengthen Obama’s hand in diplomacy and non‑proliferation efforts, and that in retrospect the decision “did not achieve what the committee had hoped for,” a phrase widely reported as expressing regret or calling the award a mistake ^{[2] [7] [8]}. Multiple outlets summarized Lundestad’s account as conceding the prize failed to produce the hoped‑for political effect, and some headlines framed his tone as regretful—an interpretation he later had to clarify amid media attention ^{[3] [8]}.

2. The original rationale: praise for a “new climate” in diplomacy

When the 2009 prize was announced, Lundestad and the Nobel Committee publicly praised Obama’s “creation of a new climate in international politics,” especially his outreach and emphasis on nuclear arms control—arguments that formed the official statutory basis for the award at the time ^{[4] [5]}. That contemporaneous justification contrasted sharply with Lundestad’s later emphasis on the committee’s intention to catalyze future policy rather than reward an established track record, a nuance that drove much of the retrospective debate ^{[4] [9]}.

3. Other insiders: defense, analogy and limited public dissent

At least one committee figure, then‑chair Thorbjørn Jagland, drew analogies between Obama and past laureates such as Willy Brandt—suggesting the prize could recognize a shift from confrontation toward dialogue—while other insiders stayed largely silent or reiterated the original rationale ^{[6] [5]}. The public record contains few sweeping after‑the‑fact denunciations from sitting committee members beyond Lundestad’s memoir excerpt; instead, later commentary tended toward defending the process or stressing legalistic adherence to Nobel’s statutes ^[6].

4. Media interpretations and pushback over “regret” claims

Several outlets and commentators ran with the line that Lundestad “regretted” or called the prize a mistake, a reading that drew correction from fact‑checking and from Lundestad himself, who told reporters that some summaries oversimplified his book and that he had not urged the prize be returned or declared it categorically illegitimate ^{[6] [9]}. Critics and supporters of Obama alike seized on selective quotes: opponents highlighted subsequent military actions to argue the prize was premature, while defenders pointed to the committee’s stated aims and the unfamiliar role of awards as instruments of policy encouragement ^{[6] [8]}.

5. What this record allows—and what it does not

The sourced record supports two secure conclusions: the Nobel Committee originally justified the 2009 award on the basis of a new diplomatic posture under Obama, and Lundestad later admitted the committee’s expectation that the award would bolster Obama’s diplomacy was not fulfilled and described the outcome as a mistake in his memoir and interviews ^{[4] [2] [3]}. The record does not support sweeping claims that the entire committee uniformly “regretted” the prize, nor does it show a coordinated later reversal by all Nobel insiders; fact‑checks note Lundestad’s remarks were nuanced and that some media characterizations overstated his position ^{[6] [9]}.