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What are the most notable examples of right-wing violence in the US since 2020?
Executive Summary
Since 2020, multiple high‑profile acts of right‑wing violence in the United States have converged into three prominent trends: white‑supremacist mass attacks, anti‑government/militia plots and assaults, and ideologically driven assaults tied to conspiracy movements and anti‑abortion/anti‑minority targets. Analyses compiled here identify the January 6, 2021, Capitol assault, the 2020–21 "boogaloo" murders, the 2022 mass shootings in Buffalo and Colorado Springs, the Michigan Whitmer kidnapping plot and other militia conspiracies, and a rise in targeted attacks on officials and institutions as the most notable examples and patterns since 2020 [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. A violent yearbook: Which incidents keep recurring in reporting and why they matter
Multiple source analyses converge on a set of incidents repeatedly invoked as emblematic of post‑2020 right‑wing violence. The January 6, 2021 Capitol riot is universally described as a focal event that combined mass mobilization, direct attacks on democratic institutions, deaths, and subsequent seditious‑conspiracy prosecutions; analysts treat it as a watershed for contemporary right‑wing political violence [1] [2]. Parallel to that, the boogaloo movement’s 2020 killings — notably the Oakland federal officer murder and the Santa Cruz sheriff’s deputy killing attributed to Steven Carrillo — are cited as examples of anti‑government violence carried out by loosely networked extremists who embraced accelerationist narratives [1]. These episodes matter because they show both organized militia plots and decentralized lone‑actor violence coexisting, which complicates law‑enforcement and prevention efforts and has prompted several official and civil‑society studies documenting shifts in targets and tactics [3] [4]. The repeated naming of specific mass shootings — Buffalo and Colorado Springs in 2022 — underscores a persistent white‑supremacist accelerationist thread that aims to maximize casualties and publicity, and which researchers link to online radicalization and manifestos that reference racial replacement theories [2].
2. Patterns not anecdotes: What datasets and agencies say about scope and trends
Aggregate analyses indicate that right‑wing extremists have accounted for a substantial share of ideologically motivated killings in recent years, with some datasets and a now‑removed DOJ study reporting far more fatalities from far‑right actors than from the far left since 1990 and particularly post‑2020 [4]. Civil‑society tracking by groups like the ADL found a spike in incidents after 2020 spanning mass shootings, arson, and plots, and described three dominant strands: white‑supremacist terrorism, anti‑government militia activity, and targeted attacks on clinics, synagogues and other minorities [2]. Other analysts emphasize an increase in attacks and plots against government targets motivated by partisan views between 2016 and 2023, highlighting a shift toward politically targeted violence such as the Solomon Peña shootings at Democratic officials’ homes [3]. These different datasets and briefings collectively present a pattern of elevated lethality and diversification of targets rather than isolated or single‑issue phenomena, though methodologies and timeframes vary across reports [5] [6].
3. Disputed emphases: Where analysts diverge and why that matters for understanding risk
Reports disagree on magnitude and year‑to‑year trajectories: one analysis notes that right‑wing extremist violence remained more frequent and deadly than left‑wing violence since 2020 [5], while another source contends that by 2025 left‑wing attacks had sharply declined and in one year outnumbered far‑right attacks — indicating substantial annual variability and sensitivity to short‑term shifts [7]. The DOJ study’s removal from an official site complicates transparency and fuels contested narratives about how much emphasis agencies place on right‑wing threats [4]. Researchers and watchdogs also differ on categorization: some incidents are framed primarily as racially motivated mass murder, others as anti‑government terrorism or criminal acts amplified by conspiracy culture, and these labeling choices shape policy responses and resource allocation [2] [3]. These divergences matter because policy decisions and public perception depend on whether violence is seen as sporadic criminality, organized domestic terrorism, or politically coordinated insurgency, which in turn influences prosecutorial strategies and prevention funding.
4. Emerging frontiers: new targets, online links, and the crossover of movements
Analysts highlight a notable crossover between extremist streams: online conspiracies (QAnon themes), white‑supremacist accelerationism, and anti‑government militia narratives increasingly intersected in perpetrators’ motives and communications around events such as the Capitol riot and subsequent attacks. The ADL and other trackers document arsons on clinics, attempted bombings of religious institutions, and targeted assaults on public officials and minority communities, indicating a widening target set beyond traditional symbolic sites to everyday institutions and local officials [2] [6]. The pattern of localized harassment escalating into shootings or plots (for example, the Peña case against Democratic officials) illustrates how partisan grievance can morph into attempted political intimidation and lethal targeting, thereby changing the scope of protective needs for local democratic infrastructure [3]. This blending of grievances and tactics raises challenges for prevention because actors may self‑radicalize online, retain loose ties to movements, and exploit decentralized tactics that evade traditional intelligence collection [2].
5. What remains uncertain and what watchdogs recommend watching next
Key uncertainties persist about the precise annual trajectory and the relative roles of organized groups versus lone actors because datasets use different definitions and some governmental analyses have been withdrawn or contested [4] [5]. Watchers recommend monitoring militia plotting, the evolution of accelerationist rhetoric, attacks linked to anti‑abortion and anti‑minority animus, and partisan targeting of local officials, as these areas have produced notable incidents since 2020 and could signal contagion effects if left unchecked [2] [3]. Given the documented overlap across ideological, organizational, and digital vectors, researchers and policymakers stress a multi‑pronged approach combining targeted prosecutions, community policing, and digital counter‑radicalization to mitigate both immediate threats and long‑term recruitment pipelines [1] [2].