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What obligations do nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states have under the NPT?
Executive summary
The NPT creates a "grand bargain": non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA verification, while the five recognised nuclear-weapon States (NWS) undertake not to transfer weapons and to pursue disarmament negotiations and cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (see [1], [2], [3]). Sources repeatedly frame these obligations as three interlinked “pillars”: non‑proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses — a bargain many NNWS say is under strain because progress on Article VI disarmament has been limited [1] [2] [4].
1. What NNWS must do: a legal duty not to acquire weapons and to accept safeguards
Under Article II and Article III, every State party that is a non‑nuclear‑weapon State commits not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and must conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA so that nuclear material for peaceful uses cannot be diverted to weapons [1] [5]. The IAEA has the explicit verification role under the Treaty to monitor NNWS compliance and the safeguards regime is presented as central to the NPT’s non‑proliferation pillar [1].
2. What the five NWS must do: no transfers, no assisting, and a binding disarmament duty
The five NPT nuclear‑weapon States (United States, Russia, China, France, UK) are obliged not to transfer possession or control of nuclear weapons to any recipient and not to assist, encourage or induce NNWS to acquire them [3]. Article VI creates a legally binding treaty obligation for States parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith" on effective measures toward cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament — a duty that applies to the NWS in particular and is central to dispute about compliance [3] [2].
3. Peaceful uses: a reciprocal right and a verification condition
The NPT guarantees the right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but that right is subject to NNWS complying with safeguards to prevent diversion to weapons [3] [1]. The treaty thus links technology transfer for civilian purposes to non‑proliferation verification, forming the third pillar of the bargain [1] [2].
4. Verification, safeguards and the IAEA’s role
The IAEA is the treaty’s verification arm: NNWS must conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements to enable the Agency to verify fulfilment of Treaty obligations and prevent diversion of peaceful nuclear material to weapons [1]. UN reporting shows most NPT parties have safeguards in force (e.g., 183 NNWS with CSAs as of end‑2024), and additional protocols are promoted to strengthen verification [6].
5. Disputes and accountability: expectations versus practice
Multiple sources note a credibility gap: many NNWS and civil society argue the NWS have failed to deliver meaningful disarmament despite Article VI’s binding negotiation duty, pointing to continued large arsenals and modernization programs; proponents of the NPT counter that NWS have reduced some stockpiles and engage in arms control diplomacy [4] [7] [2] [8]. The tension has driven parallel efforts like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which some say complements the NPT and others warn could deepen divisions [4] [9].
6. Limits, enforcement and withdrawal
The NPT relies on IAEA safeguards, political pressure and review conferences rather than a centralized enforcement mechanism; UN and IAEA instruments (including Security Council measures) play roles when alleged violations arise [5] [6]. Article X allows withdrawal with notice, a mechanism that became contentious in cases such as North Korea; recent reporting notes states have threatened withdrawal amid conflicts [10] [6]. Available sources do not present a single, definitive enforcement pathway beyond these measures (not found in current reporting).
7. Competing perspectives and implicit agendas
Governments of NWS emphasise stepwise, verifiable reductions and the Treaty’s stability value, citing historical arsenal reductions and joint statements reaffirming Article VI commitments [7] [8]. Critics — many NNWS and disarmament NGOs — argue the NWS’ modernization and slow pace of disarmament undermine the bargain and prompted pursuit of the TPNW [4] [9]. Each side advances an agenda: NWS stress deterrence and gradualism; many NNWS and civil society press for categorical prohibition and faster disarmament [7] [4] [9].
8. Bottom line for a reader
The NPT legally binds NNWS to forgo nuclear weapons and accept IAEA safeguards, while NWS are bound not to transfer weapons and to pursue disarmament negotiations in good faith; all parties have the right to peaceful nuclear technology subject to verification [1] [3] [2]. How well those mutual obligations are being fulfilled is contested in international forums: sources document both compliance mechanisms and continuing political disputes over disarmament progress and verification depth [1] [6] [4].