How did Obama's 2016 bombing campaigns impact US relations with Russia and China?

1. From attribution to retaliation: what the Obama team did and when

After U.S. intelligence linked hacking and influence operations to Russia, the Obama administration publicly attributed the effort and announced sanctions, expulsions and other retaliatory measures at the end of 2016 — moves widely reported as the official U.S. response and noted as sweeping punishments by the outgoing administration ^{[1] [2]}. Internal debates about public timing — including concerns about influencing the election and whether to act in real time — shaped the administration’s cautious cadence ^[6].

2. How Washington’s actions changed the U.S.–Russia relationship

The public attribution and retaliatory measures heightened bilateral tensions: U.S. statements, sanctions and diplomatic expulsions signaled a tougher stance that “heightened US‑Russia tensions” and led to closures of facilities and other retaliatory dynamics referenced in contemporaneous reporting ^{[1] [2]}. A later bipartisan Senate Intelligence report found the Obama White House siloed cyber and geopolitical responses, limiting options and complicating a unified deterrent approach — a factor that affected how durable or escalatory the U.S. pushback would be ^[4].

3. Critics say the response was too weak; others say it was measured

Contemporary commentary split. Some analysts and pundits argued Obama’s broader Russia policy — beyond 2016 responses — was permissive and emboldened Moscow, with critics linking that posture to later aggressive Russian moves in the region ^{[7] [5]}. Conversely, cyber‑security experts and administration defenders pointed to concrete actions (sanctions, expulsions) and highlighted the complexities of mounting a different response without appearing to influence a U.S. election outcome ^{[6] [3]}. The Senate report explicitly detailed internal constraints and recommended stronger, pre‑planned response options for future interference ^[4].

4. China: a different playbook but overlapping consequences

Obama’s handling of Chinese cyber activity followed a more diplomatic track in 2015 — an agreement with Xi to curb commercial hacking that analysts say produced a measurable drop in China‑sourced private sector intrusions ^[3]. The January 2017 intelligence assessment’s public narrative focused on Russia; reporting later highlighted that officials had at times discussed China’s past campaign targeting U.S. campaigns, and critics claim China was underemphasized in public products ^[8]. Available sources do not mention a direct link between Obama’s 2016 kinetic bombing campaigns and a major change in U.S.–China relations; reporting centers on cyber diplomacy and broader strategic competition ^{[3] [8]}.

5. Did U.S. actions drive Russia–China coordination?

Some commentators argue U.S. pressure on Moscow pushed Russia closer to China as both sought alternatives to Western influence — a long‑running geopolitical dynamic accentuated by mutual interests and deals such as energy and strategic cooperation noted in the literature ^[5]. Other sources emphasize Russia’s independent agency and separate motivations; the evidence in provided reporting links U.S. policy choices to strained Moscow ties but does not present a single causal chain making the two states an allied bloc solely because of 2016 U.S. actions ^{[1] [5]}. The varied perspectives show legitimate disagreement among analysts ^[5].

6. Institutional lessons and lasting effects

Congressional and independent reviews concluded the Obama administration’s structural choices — treating cyber and geopolitical threats separately and lacking standing response options — limited U.S. flexibility and preparedness for future election threats; the Senate Intelligence Committee urged creating rapid, apolitical options and better threat assessments ^[4]. Journalistic and policy pieces view the late‑2016 measures as meaningful but imperfect — effective at signaling U.S. displeasure yet insufficient to fully deter continued Russian influence activities ^{[3] [4]}.

7. Bottom line for readers

Obama’s end‑of‑term measures on Russian interference escalated diplomatic friction with Moscow and highlighted gaps in U.S. cyber‑response planning; with China, the administration relied more on negotiated limits in the cyber realm while strategic rivalry continued. Sources disagree about whether actions were too weak or wisely restrained, and bipartisan reviews stress that siloed decision‑making constrained U.S. options ^{[2] [6] [4] [3] [5]}.