What fraction of deportations under Obama were interior removals versus border returns, and how does that affect criminality rates?

Checked on January 29, 2026
Disclaimer: Factually can make mistakes. Please verify important information or breaking news. Learn more.

Executive summary

The Obama years saw a shifting mix of deportation actions: early in his presidency interior removals were high—often over 200,000 a year—but over time a growing share of actions were border returns or removals tied to border apprehensions rather than long-term interior enforcement [1] [2]. Policy priorities and changing operational practices produced contradictory signals about criminality: official DHS counts emphasize that a large majority of interior removals involved people with criminal convictions, while independent analyses show many overall deportations involved minor infractions or no criminal history, especially among border cases [3] [2] [4].

1. The split in plain numbers: interior removals versus border actions

At the start of the period that many analysts focus on, removals reached hundreds of thousands annually—nearly 360,000 formal removals in FY2008, with roughly 234,000 of those recorded as interior removals [3]. Interior removals averaged over 200,000 per year during Obama’s first term before declining; by FY2016 interior removals had fallen substantially according to several analyses [1] [5]. Migration Policy research notes that border removals rose sharply and represented roughly 70 percent of all removals by FY2013, reflecting a shift from returns at the border to more formal removals processed there [2].

2. Who counted as an “interior removal” and why that matters

Interior removals are removals initiated within the United States (typically ICE cases) and have different legal consequences than border returns or voluntary departures [3]. During FY2011–13, criminal removals accounted for about 80 percent of interior removals, reflecting deliberate prioritization of noncitizens with criminal convictions in interior enforcement [2]. DHS and Migration Policy highlight that in 2016 “more than 90 percent” of interior removals involved people whom DHS classified as convicted of serious crimes, signaling an administrative focus on criminals for interior action [3].

3. Border returns and the large denominator that changes the picture

A substantial share of the overall deportation tally during the Obama era consisted of border actions—returns and removals tied to Border Patrol apprehensions—that are operationally and socially different from ICE interior arrests [2] [6]. Analyses show many non-criminal removals and returns occurred at or near the border: for example, most of the roughly 152,000 deportations of people without criminal convictions in a cited analysis occurred at the border zone, and border removals rose in later years [7] [3]. This high volume of border processing inflates aggregate deportation counts while including many people with minimal or no criminal records [7] [4].

4. How the split affects interpretation of criminality rates

Counting removals without separating border returns from interior removals produces divergent impressions of criminality: when attention is restricted to interior removals, the share convicted of serious crimes is large—often cited as 80–90 percent depending on the period and metric—because ICE prioritized criminals in interior enforcement [2] [3]. But when the broader universe of all deportation actions is considered, independent investigations found that around two-thirds of cases during a multi‑year window involved minor infractions or no criminal record, underscoring that the overall deportation population included many non‑criminals [4]. In short, the numerator (criminal interior removals) can look overwhelmingly “criminal,” while the larger denominator (all removals + returns) dilutes that rate and reveals many low‑level or noncriminal cases [2] [4].

5. Why reputable sources disagree and what to watch for in the data

Differences arise from definitions and agency practices: DHS, ICE, and CBP count different types of actions, and border apprehensions transferred to ICE can be tallied as removals even though the person was caught at the border [8] [2]. Advocacy groups and investigative reporters have highlighted that many deportations under Obama involved traffic offenses, immigration re‑entry, or minor convictions—facts that are true even as DHS emphasizes criminal‑alien removals within the interior [4] [7]. Readers should therefore insist on apples‑to‑apples comparisons—distinguishing interior ICE removals from CBP border returns—before inferring a simple link between overall deportation totals and public‑safety outcomes [2] [6].

6. Bottom line

The fraction of deportation actions that were interior removals declined over the Obama years while border removals and returns comprised a growing share; interior removals during key years were heavily weighted toward those with criminal convictions (often cited at 80–90 percent), but when the full set of deportation actions is counted many cases involved minor offenses or no criminal record, especially among border cases [1] [2] [3] [4]. Any claim that Obama’s deportation totals equate directly to removals of dangerous criminals requires clarifying which category of removal is being measured and acknowledging the contrasting findings in DHS reports versus independent investigations [3] [4].

Want to dive deeper?
How did Secure Communities and Priority Enforcement Program change interior deportation patterns under Obama?
What are the methodological differences between DHS removal counts and independent analyses like TRAC/NYT that affect criminality rates?
How do deportation mixes (interior vs border) affect immigrant communities and local crime statistics?