What role did Pakistan, Iran, and Russia play in shaping intra-Afghan peace talks after the deal?

Checked on December 12, 2025
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Executive summary

Pakistan, Iran and Russia have each played active but distinct roles in shaping intra‑Afghan diplomacy after the October ceasefire: Pakistan pressed the Taliban to rein in militant groups it blames for deadly cross‑border attacks and has both negotiated directly and threatened force when talks faltered [1] [2]. Iran publicly offered to mediate between Islamabad and Kabul and has taken part in regional consultative formats that press the Taliban on terrorism and humanitarian issues [3] [4]. Russia has hosted and chaired multilateral consultations — the Moscow Format and quadrilateral talks — framing stability, counter‑terrorism and economic engagement as tools to influence intra‑Afghan outcomes [4] [5].

1. Pakistan: From mediator to enforcer — pressure rooted in security losses

Pakistan emerged from the ceasefire negotiations as the most urgent external pressure on the Taliban to act against groups like the Tehreek‑e‑Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Islamabad signed a ceasefire in Doha on 19 October but repeatedly portrayed the peace process in security terms: Pakistani officials demanded verifiable Taliban action against militants who have killed many Pakistani soldiers, and when a second round of talks in Istanbul failed, Pakistani ministers publicly warned of escalation — even threatening to “obliterate” the Taliban — signaling that diplomacy was backed by credible coercive intent [2] [6]. Reporting also highlights deep mistrust: Afghan officials countered that the Taliban lacks control over some groups and accused Pakistan of unreasonable demands, showing that Pakistan’s leverage rests on security imperatives, not on shared trust [7] [1].

2. Iran: Mediator, host and regional convenor with a dual track of humanitarian and security rhetoric

Tehran has positioned itself as a mediator and concerned neighbour, offering facilitation between Islamabad and Kabul and repeatedly emphasizing refugee burdens and humanitarian needs alongside counter‑terrorism. Iran’s foreign minister publicly offered to facilitate talks, Iranian delegates participated in regional consultations, and Pakistani officials welcomed Iran’s constructive potential in Pakistan‑Afghanistan relations — a posture that frames Iranian involvement as stabilising and humanitarian, as well as political [8] [9] [3]. Iran’s approach in multilateral fora also stresses the need to support Afghan livelihoods as part of a “lasting solution” and shares the regional demand that Afghanistan prevent its soil from being used against neighbours [5].

3. Russia: Convenor of formats, diplomatic leverage and economic carrots

Russia has used the Moscow Format and quadrilateral diplomacy to shape the agenda in favour of counter‑terrorism cooperation and economic engagement, which serves both security and influence objectives. Moscow chaired high‑level consultations in which Russia urged expanded business ties and anti‑drug and anti‑terror cooperation with the Taliban present; it also convened the four‑way foreign ministers’ meeting in New York that reiterated support for an “independent, united and peaceful” Afghanistan and called for international assistance and refugee repatriation [4] [5]. Russia has publicly offered to mediate Pakistan–Afghanistan tensions, signaling its intent to be a broker whose leverage comes from hosting multilateral mechanisms and promising economic and security cooperation [8].

4. Multilateral tracks: Quadrilateral and Moscow Format as the needle movers

Two parallel mechanisms dominated regional influence after the deal. The China‑Iran‑Pakistan‑Russia quadrilateral met on the margins of the UN General Assembly and urged Afghan authorities to create conditions for refugee return, and to act against terrorism, pressing for international support and adjusted sanctions approaches [5] [10]. The Moscow Format convened a broader set of neighbours including India and Central Asian states, with Russia stressing both security and business ties; participants collectively called for comprehensive measures to eliminate terrorism and warned against foreign military footprints in the region [4] [11]. These formats reflect a regional consensus on counter‑terrorism, even as they differ in diplomatic styles and interests.

5. Competing narratives and limits: What the sources show — and do not

Sources show common regional demands: verifiable Taliban action against militant groups, humanitarian assistance, and refugee repatriation [5] [11]. They also show divergence: Pakistan links compliance to security guarantees and threatens force when talks sputter [2], while Iran emphasizes mediation and burden‑sharing for refugees [3] [9], and Russia focuses on convening power and economic ties to shape Taliban behaviour [4] [8]. Available sources do not mention detailed, direct incentives or concessions the Taliban accepted in exchange for regional engagement beyond ceasefire commitments (not found in current reporting).

6. Bottom line: Regional actors shaping outcomes through pressure, mediation and forums

Pakistan has been the most forceful actor pressing for immediate security remedies; Iran has offered mediation while foregrounding humanitarian burdens; and Russia has leveraged convening power and promises of economic cooperation to shepherd a regional consensus on counter‑terrorism and stability. All three operate through multilateral formats that emphasize Taliban responsibility for preventing cross‑border terrorism, but deep mutual mistrust and competing national narratives mean diplomatic progress remains fragile [2] [5] [4].

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