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How have Palestinian casualty rates changed over time during major operations and ceasefires since 2023?
Executive summary
Palestinian casualty counts since October 7, 2023 show a sharp, sustained rise during major Israeli operations with temporary slowdowns or disputed drops during ceasefires, but the overall trend is upward: health authorities reported more than 60,000 deaths by mid‑2025 and independent analyses estimated tens of thousands more from undercounting and indirect causes [1] [2]. Reporting and methodology disputes—between Gaza health authorities, Israeli military data, and peer‑reviewed studies—make precise casualty‑rate comparisons across operations and ceasefires difficult [3] [2].
1. Rapid spikes during major operations: ground and air campaigns
When Israel escalated to large ground operations (for example starting 27 October 2023 and resumed offensives in 2025), Palestinian deaths rose sharply: Palestinian health authorities reported the Gaza campaign caused more than 60,000 deaths by mid‑2025 and over 67,000–68,000 by October 2025, figures that track substantial increases coinciding with renewed all‑out air and ground campaigns [1] [4] [5]. These spikes correlate with concentrated periods of intense bombardment and ground fighting described in contemporaneous reporting [1].
2. Ceasefires produce temporary slowdowns but not settled declines
Available sources indicate ceasefires temporarily slowed fighting and reported daily casualty rates, but large cumulative death tolls continued to grow because of resumed operations and ongoing effects of the campaign; Reuters notes that after a two‑month ceasefire Israel resumed full operations and health officials said some 8,500 deaths followed that resumption [1]. Sources do not provide a clean, consistent time‑series of casualty rates that would allow precise quantification of rate changes during each ceasefire period (not found in current reporting).
3. Independent estimates suggest official tallies undercounted early on
A peer‑reviewed Lancet capture–recapture analysis estimated 64,260 traumatic‑injury deaths from Oct 7, 2023 to June 30, 2024—substantially higher than some official counts for the same period—implying official tallies may have undercounted direct traumatic deaths by a large margin due to disrupted reporting and overwhelmed health systems [2]. Reuters and other outlets cite that official tallies likely undercounted casualties by around 40% in the early months as Gaza’s health infrastructure collapsed [1] [2].
4. Conflicting classifications: civilian vs. combatant and rival agendas
A major reporting tension is disagreement over how many of the dead were militants versus civilians. The Guardian’s reporting on a leaked Israeli military database suggested the army’s internal data counted many deaths as militants while also indicating a very high civilian proportion; at the same time the IDF publicly reported thousands of militants killed, and Israeli officials have questioned Gaza ministry figures as politicised [3]. These conflicting classifications reflect institutional agendas: Gaza authorities report aggregate deaths without reliably distinguishing combatant status, while Israeli sources emphasise militant fatalities to justify operations [3] [1].
5. Indirect deaths and long‑term effects change the casualty picture
Beyond immediate battle deaths, analysts warn of indirect and excess mortality from disease, malnutrition and lack of care. The Lancet authors and other humanitarian analyses stress that pandemic‑style health collapse and interrupted reporting mean traumatic‑injury counts understate total deaths and that thousands more may have died or will die from indirect causes—thus casualty rates “during” operations and ceasefires are not limited to direct strike tallies [2].
6. West Bank and broader geography complicate trends
Casualty dynamics differ outside Gaza. The West Bank saw heightened fatalities in 2023 and afterwards—reports show rising Israeli‑Palestinian fatalities and settler violence, with dozens to hundreds killed in waves of raids and confrontations—so overall Palestinian casualty trends since 2023 aren’t confined to Gaza and vary by area and type of operation [6] [7]. UN and OCHA warn that some datasets exclude Gaza figures until independently verified, complicating cross‑region rate comparisons [8].
7. What the data cannot yet tell us — and why that matters
Available sources lack a harmonised, day‑by‑day casualty rate series tied to clearly defined “major operations” and ceasefires; reporting gaps, hospital reporting stoppages, and methodological differences (ministries, military databases, academic capture‑recapture) prevent definitive quantitative statements about exact rate changes tied to each truce or operation [2] [8]. This limitation matters because policy and humanitarian planning depend on knowing whether ceasefires produce durable reductions in mortality or only temporary pauses.
8. How to read future updates: reconcile sources and watch methodology
Going forward, meaningful assessment requires triangulating Gaza health ministry totals, independent academic estimates (like The Lancet study), and any available Israeli military data while scrutinising classification methods and coverage gaps; readers should treat single‑source totals as provisional and expect revisions as capture‑recapture and post‑conflict accounting continue [2] [3].