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How do paper ballot vs. electronic machine counts compare in 2024 election results?
Executive Summary
Paper-based voting dominated the 2024 U.S. general election: more than 98% of ballots had an auditable paper record, and jurisdictions used a mix of hand-marked paper, ballot-marking devices (BMDs), and direct-recording electronic (DRE) systems with varied tabulation methods. Security experts warn BMDs and electronic systems present attack surfaces and usability risks, while operational studies show paper workflows often produce faster voter throughput; legal challenges in 2025 have focused on local anomalies rather than nationwide machine-versus-paper systematic failure.
1. Why the “paper won” headline matters — auditability and the 2024 baseline
Federal and nonprofit reporting indicates that over 98% of votes in 2024 were cast on systems that produced a paper record, enabling post‑election audits and manual verifications [1] [2]. That shift matters because paper records allow optical-scan tabulation to be checked against physical ballots, and because many states expanded risk-limiting audits after earlier reform pushes. Ballotpedia’s state-by-state equipment inventory confirms substantial heterogeneity: some jurisdictions used hand-marked paper ballots scanned by optical readers, others used BMDs that print a paper ballot for voter review, and a minority relied on DREs [3]. The practical consequence is that nationwide comparisons between “paper” and “electronic” counts must account for this mixed ecosystem rather than a binary split.
2. Security warnings from technical experts — what they actually said in 2024
Academic and technical experts, notably Princeton’s Andrew Appel, warned in 2024 that BMDs and some electronic systems can be manipulated to print incorrect ballots which most voters fail to detect [4]. That warning led jurisdictions to favor hand-marked ballots where feasible, since hand-marked paper ballots reduce the chance that a device silently alters preferences before a voter sees a paper record. The security critique is not an assertion that widespread fraud occurred in 2024, but a design claim: machine interfaces and firmware changes create attack vectors and increase reliance on robust auditing processes. States that maintain rigorous post-election audits can mitigate those theoretical risks; absence of audits keeps questions open.
3. Operational efficiency — studies show tradeoffs between speed and machine use
Comparative studies predating 2024 found that paper-ballot workflows often produced shorter in‑system times than BMD-based systems, with Rhode Island 2018 (hand-marked) averaging 5.44 minutes versus Georgia 2022 (BMD) averaging 7.74 minutes per voter in simulation work [5]. Those findings reflect check-in, marking, and tabulation differences: hand-marked ballots eliminate the extra step of navigating a BMD interface and machine printout verification. Efficiency gains for paper systems can translate into shorter lines and fewer provisional ballots; however, jurisdictions with high accessibility needs may prefer BMDs despite possible time costs. Operational tradeoffs therefore informed equipment choices in 2024 as election officials balanced accessibility, throughput, and auditability [3] [2].
4. Where counts diverged and courts took notice — local disputes, not a national collapse
Post‑2024 litigation has focused on localized anomalies rather than wholesale discrepancies between paper and machine counts. A 2025 lawsuit in Rockland County, NY, alleged statistical anomalies and requested a hand recount; experts cautioned anomalies do not prove wrongdoing and may result from tabulation errors or recording mistakes [6] [7]. The suit prompted document discovery about machines, software updates, and lab approvals; election certification and federal procedures, however, had already finalized national outcomes, making systemic overturn unlikely [7]. The salient point is that audits and recounts are the mechanisms to resolve disputed local tallies — the presence of paper records influences courts and fact‑finding processes.
5. Divergent viewpoints — officials, advocacy groups, and technologists clash
Election officials and the Election Assistance Commission reported high deployment of auditable systems and emphasized audit capacity as evidence of election integrity [2]. Advocacy groups highlighted this as a positive baseline, framing paper‑backed systems as a success for transparency [1]. Technical critics countered that BMDs and vendor software updates remain unresolved vulnerabilities needing stricter regulation and testing [4]. Each viewpoint serves different agendas: officials stress stability and scalability, advocates stress transparency metrics, and technologists stress residual risks. Understanding 2024 results requires synthesizing these positions rather than privileging any single narrative.
6. Big-picture takeaway and what’s still uncertain
The 2024 election demonstrated that paper records are now the de facto standard, enabling audits and targeted recounts where questions arise [1] [2]. However, mixed equipment inventories, BMD security warnings, and localized legal challenges in 2025 show unresolved operational and technical tensions [3] [4] [6]. The policy implications are straightforward: expand hand‑marked ballots where feasible, mandate robust post‑election audits, tighten certification and change‑control for vendor software, and preserve accessibility through carefully chosen BMD deployments. Final resolution of disputed local counts depends on audits and recounts, not national proclamations, and those mechanisms are most effective when jurisdictions document and retain paper ballot evidence.