How did legal definitions of 'sexual relations' used in the Paula Jones deposition influence the impeachment case against Clinton?
Executive summary
The narrowly negotiated legal definition of "sexual relations" used during President Clinton’s Paula Jones deposition became the hinge on which charges of perjury and obstruction in the subsequent impeachment turned, because evidence later showed contacts that Clinton and Lewinsky had not characterized as falling within that definition [1] [2]. Debate over what the phrase included—particularly whether it covered receiving oral sex—shaped prosecutors’ arguments, Clinton’s defenses, judicial findings of false testimony, and political narratives about culpability [1] [2] [3].
1. What was agreed in the Jones deposition and why it mattered
During pretrial discovery in the Jones sexual-harassment suit, lawyers for both sides negotiated a specific, limited definition of "sexual relations" that framed the deposition questions Clinton would answer under oath, and Clinton denied having "sexual relations" with Monica Lewinsky in that deposition [4] [5]. Because the denial used the exact wording from the agreed definition, the scope of that definition became legally central: if certain acts were not encompassed by the agreed phrase, then a denial might technically be true even if other sexual conduct had occurred [1] [6].
2. The contested boundary: receiving versus giving oral sex
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and later House impeachment managers seized on a distinction Clinton later articulated—that he believed the deposition definition excluded his receiving oral sex—arguing that the president’s sworn denials nonetheless misrepresented the truth when judged against evidence such as Lewinsky’s testimony and the physical evidence later described in the Starr Report [2] [1] [3]. Clinton’s own statements before the Starr grand jury—reported as saying the agreed definition excluded his receiving oral sex—provided prosecutors a factual basis to allege perjury, because the evidence indicated sexual contact inconsistent with his deposition denials [2] [1].
3. How legal semantics translated into impeachment charges
The impeachment articles that the Republican-controlled House adopted accused Clinton of perjury and obstruction of justice grounded not in the underlying consensual relationship allegation alone but in the claim that he had lied under oath and later obstructed the investigation into those denials; thus the definitional dispute about "sexual relations" was the proximate legal lever that converted a private sexual liaison into an impeachable act of false testimony [3] [7]. Prosecutors argued the deposition language and Clinton’s public statements created an objective standard against which his sworn answers could be measured [1] [3].
4. Competing interpretations and legal realism
Scholars and commentators later emphasized that legal definitions in depositions are often technical and negotiated to limit exposure in litigation, and that relying on granular semantics to prove perjury raises difficult questions about mens rea and materiality—whether a literal but misleading denial is equivalent to intent to deceive for impeachment purposes [6]. Critics of Starr’s approach argued he stretched a narrow discovery tool into a political prosecution, while supporters said the agreed wording made Clinton’s denials unambiguously false in light of the evidence [7] [1].
5. Political and narrative consequences beyond the courtroom
Beyond legal pleadings, the framing of "sexual relations" fueled media soundbites and political theater—the famous public denials, televised statements, and later revelations fed a scandal narrative that Republicans used to justify impeachment and Democrats to defend presidential fitness—turning a technical evidentiary dispute into a national controversy about truth, personal morality, and abuse of power [8] [1]. Different actors had clear incentives: independent prosecutors seeking impeachable offenses expanded investigatory scope [7], while Clinton’s team stressed narrow definitions and contextual intent to mitigate legal liability [6].
6. Aftermath: law, punishment, and unresolved debates
The House voted to impeach on charges that included perjury tied to the Jones deposition denials, but the Senate acquitted Clinton; judicial consequences followed too—Judge Susan Webber Wright later found civil contempt for misleading testimony and imposed sanctions—demonstrating that the deposition definition’s legal footprint persisted in courts even as political removal failed [1] [3]. The episode left enduring questions about how semantic bargains in civil litigation can be weaponized in criminal or constitutional proceedings, a topic legal scholars continue to dissect [6].