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Fact check: What percentage of conservatives justify violence against public figures?

Checked on October 28, 2025
Searched for:
"percentage of conservatives justify violence against public figures survey statistics"
"conservatives support political violence against public figures percentage"
"partisan support for political violence public figures 2020 2023 2024 polls"
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Executive Summary

The available polls and studies present conflicting snapshots but converge on a troubling reality: a sizable minority of self-identified conservatives and Republicans express that political violence can be justified, with estimates clustering roughly between one-quarter and one-third in several surveys conducted between 2023 and 2025. The numbers vary by question wording, sample, and timing, so the headline claim — that a fixed percentage of “conservatives” justify violence — overstates precision; nevertheless, multiple reputable polls show nontrivial support for political violence within Republican-aligned groups [1] [2] [3].

1. Why the Numbers Look Different — Digging into Question Wording and Timing

Different surveys ask different questions, and that drives much of the variation in reported percentages. One 2023 survey asked whether “true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” producing a result often summarized as about one in three Republicans endorsing the statement, which places the figure substantially higher than among Democrats and independents [1]. By contrast, a 2025 poll focused on whether violence can be justified to achieve political goals and reported a much lower share — 6% of Republicans — suggesting that when questions explicitly center on political goals rather than a vaguely framed “save the country,” respondents are less likely to endorse violence [4]. These distinctions show that question framing and timing materially affect measured support for political violence, so comparing raw percentages without context misleads readers [1] [4].

2. Consistent Signal: A Nontrivial Minority Across Multiple Measures

Despite methodological differences, multiple sources converge on a consistent signal: roughly one-quarter to one-third of Republicans or self-identified conservatives appear willing to countenance political violence in at least some circumstances. A 2024 study reported more than 1 in 4 Republicans, and among Republicans favorable to former President Trump the share was closer to nearly 1 in 3, a pattern echoed by 2025 polling that put Republicans around 30–31% when asked whether violence may be necessary to “get the country back on track” [3] [2] [5]. These repeated findings across years and instruments indicate a stable minority willingness rather than a single outlier result, although the exact magnitude depends on question wording and subgroup definitions [3] [2].

3. Opposing Data Points and What They Reveal About Interpretation

Some polls provide lower estimates that complicate a simple narrative that “conservatives widely justify violence.” The 2025 poll that found 6% of Republicans endorsing violence to achieve political goals is substantially lower than the 30% figures, illustrating that public willingness to accept violence depends on how broadly “violence” and the targets are defined [4]. Conversely, a different 2025 poll reported that 55% of self-identified left-of-center respondents said it was at least somewhat justified to murder a specific political figure (President Trump), which highlights that extremist sentiments are not exclusive to one political side and that comparative framing — violence against institutions versus specific individuals — produces starkly different responses [4]. These contrasts show that headline percentages require careful interpretation before generalizing about “conservatives” as a whole [4].

4. Who Is Being Measured — Partisan Labels, Favorability, and Subgroups Matter

Surveys that break out respondents by presidential favorability or ideological nuance show sharper divisions: Republicans who view former President Trump favorably are more likely to say political violence is acceptable, and these subgroups often drive higher aggregate Republican totals [3]. Polls that use broad partisan labels (Republican, Democrat, independent) will capture different compositions over time as the coalition shifts. Labeling respondents simply as “conservative” masks internal heterogeneity, including differences by age, media consumption, and elite cues, which all influence willingness to justify political violence. The studies cited show that support for violence concentrates among specific subpopulations rather than uniformly across all conservatives [3] [2].

5. Implications and Missing Context Policymakers and Media Should Note

The data collectively indicate a persistent minority willing to endorse political violence, but they do not predict who will act on those views or under what circumstances. Polls capture attitudes, not behavior, and the translation from expressed acceptability to real-world actions depends on triggers, organization, and elite rhetoric — factors outside the scope of the cited surveys. Media summaries that present a single percentage without noting question wording, the surveyed subgroup, and the date risk creating misleading impressions. Responsible reporting should therefore present the range of estimates, explain methodological differences, and highlight which subgroups drive higher support [1] [4] [3] [2].

Sources cited: [1] [4] [2] [3] [5].

Want to dive deeper?
What major polls measured support for political violence among conservatives in 2022–2024?
How do conservative and liberal respondents differ in justifying violence against public figures across Pew Research and YouGov surveys?
Which question wordings produce higher reported support for violence against politicians or public figures?
Have any demographic factors (age, education, media use) predicted support for violence within conservative groups?
How have reported levels of justification for political violence changed after high-profile events (e.g., January 6 2021, 2023 assassination attempts)?