How have far-right political parties and candidates performed in UK elections since 2019?

1. The 2019 baseline — collapse for older far‑right groups, Europe‑level success for Brexitists

By the 2019 general election, long‑standing far‑right parties were electorally marginal: UKIP’s national vote share had collapsed to around 0.1% in 2019 and the BNP had effectively ceased significant electoral activity by that year ^{[1] [2]}. At the same time the Brexit Party (the direct predecessor of Reform UK) topped the 2019 European Parliament poll in the UK, showing that anti‑EU, populist forces could still mobilise sizeable protest votes at European contests even as they failed to translate that into Westminster seats in the 2019 general election ^{[4] [3]}.

2. General elections since 2019 — limited breakthrough at Westminster until 2024 contested by sources

Mainstream reporting and election databases show that Brexit‑era protest parties failed to convert 2019 European success into Westminster seats at that year’s general election ^{[3] [5]}. Subsequent commentary and analysis indicated a growing vote share for Reform in later years, and some outlets characterise the 2024 general election as marking a sharper rise of far‑right and far‑right‑aligned populism in UK results, with commentators warning of fragmentation of the two‑party system ^{[6] [7]}. The precise seat totals and implications depend on the source and modelling approach ^{[8] [7]}.

3. Local elections, by‑elections and the rebirth of Reform UK (2022–2025)

Local contests have been a mixed picture: in 2022 several extremist and conspiracy‑aligned groups were roundly rejected and won no council seats in those polls ^[9]. By contrast, between 2024 and 2025 Reform UK made visible gains in local English elections and secured narrow parliamentary by‑election victories, which media outlets framed as the party overtaking the Conservatives in some local contexts and consolidating a new populist right flank ^{[10] [11] [12]}. These gains are reported as a combination of defections, concentrated local campaigning and mid‑cycle voter volatility rather than a uniform national takeover ^[12].

4. The actors: who counts as “far‑right” and who benefits electorally

Traditional extreme‑right parties such as the BNP and National Front have become essentially inactive electorally since 2019, with no meaningful candidate presence and no elected representation reported in that period ^{[2] [1]}. Reform UK, founded as the Brexit Party and repositioned as a hard‑right populist alternative to the Conservatives, is repeatedly identified in the sources as occupying space to the right of the Tory party and as the primary beneficiary of protest and anti‑establishment sentiment ^{[3] [4]}. Reporting also notes that some mainstream Tory figures talk about “uniting the right”, an implicit agenda that could amplify Reform’s profile if cooperation occurs ^[4].

5. Interpretation and limits: fragmentation, the electoral system and future uncertainty

Observers underline that first‑past‑the‑post magnifies or mutes surges: concentrated local support can deliver council seats or by‑election wins while national vote‑share translations to Westminster remain unpredictable without detailed modelling ^[8]. Analysts cited in mainstream sources describe a pattern of fragmentation — older far‑right parties faded while right‑wing populist parties like Reform harnessed protests to win local power — but they differ on whether this marks a durable realignment or a cyclical protest wave ^{[7] [8]}. The sources provide robust reporting on electoral outcomes and trends but vary in emphasis; they do not settle whether recent Reform gains represent a lasting realignment or a temporary rebound tied to particular political moments ^{[10] [12] [9]}.