Which Philippine agencies or officials have been investigated for funding pro-Duterte disinformation networks?
Executive summary
Philippine authorities have opened multiple probes into networks and individuals accused of spreading pro‑Duterte disinformation since former president Rodrigo Duterte’s March 2025 ICC arrest; the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) has been reported investigating about 20 vloggers and the House of Representatives formed a tri‑committee that summoned roughly 40 pro‑Duterte bloggers and influencers [1] [2]. Government agencies and lawmakers have publicly named specific amplifiers and coordinated actions — for example, a House tri‑committee hearing identified named vloggers and the Philippine Coast Guard’s spokesperson pointed to specific accounts as amplifiers [3] [4].
1. Who has formally investigated pro‑Duterte disinformation — the domestic actors
The NBI publicly said it was investigating around 20 vloggers accused of spreading false narratives tied to Duterte’s arrest, and stated it was monitoring online activities and preparing charges in some cases [1] [4]. Separately, three House of Representatives committees — Public Order and Safety, Information and Communications Technology, and Public Information — convened in February 2025 as a tri‑committee to probe social media influencers and bloggers; the inquiry called in about 40 pro‑Duterte content creators and produced takedowns of some accounts [5] [2] [6].
2. Which government offices and officials have been publicly linked to these probes
Coverage shows the Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and the Presidential Communications Office (PCO) were referenced in wider government efforts to tackle disinformation, and the NBI was explicit about its investigations and monitoring role [4]. At a House tri‑committee hearing, Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela named vloggers Anna Malindog‑Uy and Ado Paglinawan as amplifiers of disinformation narratives [3]. The reporting does not provide a comprehensive formal list of every named official who ordered investigations beyond those bodies (available sources do not mention a single, exhaustive roster).
3. Targets identified: vloggers, bloggers, and alleged foreign‑linked accounts
Reports say the probes targeted roughly two categories: local pro‑Duterte vloggers and bloggers summoned to hearings, and networks of fake or foreign‑linked accounts amplifying narratives — studies cited by government bodies and news outlets flagged up to 45% of midterm election conversations driven by fake profiles and X accounts with Chinese names used to defend the Duterte family [7] [8]. The House hearings named dozens of content creators and led to some accounts being taken down [2] [6].
4. Why authorities say they intervened — stated rationale and national security framing
Officials and analysts framed the phenomenon as both a threat to truth and, in some reporting, a national security issue: Stratbase Institute’s president warned of coordinated social media manipulation undermining state positions, and the Coast Guard warned disinformation could destabilize elections [3]. The stated aims of probes included countering false claims about the legality of Duterte’s arrest and protecting public order in the run‑up to high‑stakes midterms [1] [7].
5. Critics and risks: why enforcement is controversial
Observers and analysts warned that crackdowns might backfire by entrenching beliefs among Duterte’s supporters and deepening polarization; the South China Morning Post cited analysts saying enforcement could further legitimize conspiratorial narratives [1]. The East Asia Forum and other commentators noted a paradox: an administration with roots in disinformation is using legal levers now — raising questions about selective enforcement and political motives [6].
6. Open questions and limits of the public record
Available reporting confirms investigations by the NBI and legislative tri‑committee and names of some accused amplifiers, but the sources do not provide a complete public accounting of findings, prosecutions, or formal determinations of state funding for networks (available sources do not mention prosecutions or a definitive accounting of funding links). Likewise, while some studies and agencies flagged foreign‑style or China‑linked accounts amplifying Duterte narratives, the evidence tying specific Philippine agencies or officials to funding those networks is not established in the cited pieces (available sources do not mention direct agency funding of pro‑Duterte disinformation).
7. What to watch next
Follow NBI announcements for any formal charges and House committee reports for referrals or policy proposals; independent research centres referenced in the coverage (e.g., Cyabra analyses reviewed by Reuters) and fact‑checkers like Vera Files are likely to publish further tracing of inauthentic networks [7] [9]. Expect continued debate over whether legal probes reduce harm or fuel grievance narratives; sources already show competing viewpoints between security‑minded analysts and critics wary of politicized enforcement [3] [1].
Limitations: this account uses only the provided reporting and therefore cannot claim outcomes beyond what those articles state; the sources document who was investigated and who called hearings, but do not prove state funding of disinformation networks (available sources do not mention conclusive proof of funding by Philippine agencies).