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What support did the PLO and Fatah get
Executive summary
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), dominated by Fatah, has historically received political, military and diplomatic support from Arab states (notably Syria and Egypt at different times), sanctuary in Lebanon after Black September (1970–71), and international recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people [1] [2] [3]. Fatah has been the largest PLO faction and exercised primary control of the Palestinian Authority, but its support inside the Palestinian territories has eroded at times—especially with the rise of Hamas—and scholars and policy institutes emphasize both external state backing and internal legitimacy challenges [4] [2] [5].
1. How “support” broke down: states, sanctuary and material backing
In the 1960s–1980s era of armed struggle, Fatah and other PLO factions relied on sympathetic Arab states for sanctuary, bases and material aid. After Black September in Jordan (1970–71), Palestinian militants including Fatah relocated to Lebanon, where they based operations and depended on refugee-camp networks for fighters and logistics [1]. Britannica notes Fatah “obtained Syrian support and became based in Damascus” in its early development, showing that different Arab capitals provided varying degrees of shelter and assistance at different times [2].
2. Political and diplomatic support: PLO’s international role
Beyond military help, the PLO’s chief gain was diplomatic recognition as the main representative of the Palestinians. Over decades it built an umbrella structure that included Fatah and other factions and won seats at international fora—Britannica and other primers underline the PLO’s evolution into the international face of Palestinian claims [3] [4]. That recognition translated into political leverage that was distinct from battlefield supplies: it enabled negotiations (and later the Oslo process) that Fatah leadership pursued [2].
3. Internal resources and social bases: refugee camps and popular support
On the ground, the PLO and Fatah derived crucial manpower, logistical networks, and political legitimacy from Palestinian refugee communities—especially in Lebanon—where the PLO’s presence “relied on the support in Palestinian refugee camps” during the 1970s [1]. University and policy primers emphasize that while Fatah was historically preeminent inside the PLO, its grassroots hold fluctuated, particularly when rival movements like Hamas gained traction [6] [4].
4. Shifts after Oslo and the emergence of the Palestinian Authority
Fatah’s transition from guerrilla movement to governing party changed the character of its support. Encyclopaedia entries and policy guides describe Fatah as the driving force within both the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA); that political role brought institutional resources—administrative control, security forces, and international aid channeled to the PA—while also producing accusations of corruption and declining grassroots legitimacy that critics point to in explaining eroded support [4] [2] [7].
5. Competing viewpoints inside Palestinian politics
Contemporary reporting and analysis show sharp disagreements about what kinds of support are legitimate. Some veteran PLO figures and critics accuse Fatah of betraying resistance by engaging in Oslo-style compromises and security cooperation with Israel; those critics argue that Fatah traded armed struggle for administration and international sponsorship [8]. Conversely, policy analysts and Western think-tanks urge strengthening Fatah and PLO institutions (transparency, accountability) to counterbalance Islamist rivals like Hamas—an explicit strategic preference found in think-tank recommendations [7].
6. Recent dynamics: popularity, state patrons and fragmentation
Recent materials show the balance of popular support has shifted at moments: polls after October 7, 2023, and later reporting indicate increased West Bank sympathy for Hamas at the expense of Fatah and President Abbas, a reminder that battlefield events and hostage or prisoner outcomes affect popular legitimacy [5]. Meanwhile, fragmentation within the PLO and the multiplicity of small factions—11 factions remain in the PLO, with Fatah largest—mean external and internal backers exert influence unevenly [9].
7. What the available sources do not mention
Available sources do not mention detailed, contemporaneous line-item military transfers, covert funding streams, or specific bilateral agreements (e.g., precise weapons shipments) between particular states and Fatah/PLO in the post-1990s period; they also do not provide a full accounting of financial flows into the PA from all international donors in the latest years (not found in current reporting). Where sources did discuss state backing, they focused on sanctuary, political support and the historical arc [1] [2] [3].
8. Bottom line for readers
Historically, Fatah/PLO support combined state patronage (sanctuary and political backing), grassroots networks in refugee camps, and later institutional resources through the Palestinian Authority—yet all of these sources of support have been contested and have ebbed and flowed as regional politics changed and rivals like Hamas rose [1] [4] [2]. Analysts and political actors disagree sharply about whether bolstering Fatah’s institutions or empowering new forms of Palestinian political expression is the right path forward, and those disagreements are visible in both internal Palestinian critiques and external policy prescriptions [7] [8].