What policy options have international actors proposed to reduce communal and jihadist violence in Nigeria, and what evidence exists on their effectiveness?
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Executive summary
International actors have advanced a portfolio of policy options to reduce Nigeria’s communal and jihadist violence: military and intelligence support, capacity-building for law enforcement and justice, prevention and development programming, and regional diplomatic coordination — each backed by mixed and often limited evidence of durable success [1] [2] [3]. Independent monitors and analysts warn that heavy-handed counterinsurgency, poor accountability, and failure to address local grievances blunt effectiveness and sometimes exacerbate insecurity [4] [5].
1. Military assistance and targeted counter‑terrorism operations
Western governments and regional partners have repeatedly proposed supplying intelligence, training, equipment, and — in some proposals — direct troop cooperation to degrade Boko Haram/ISWAP and emerging jihadist networks, reflecting appeals to “radically degrade” these groups as central to any solution [6] [1]. Evidence shows short-term battlefield gains: Nigerian forces have reclaimed territory and killed commanders, but jihadists have re‑emerged in ungoverned spaces and adapted to guerilla tactics, leaving a cycle of attacks and displacement [4] [1]. Critically, reports document that indiscriminate force and overstretched troops have alienated civilians and impeded consolidation of security gains [4] [7].
2. Capacity‑building, counter‑terrorism legislation and criminal justice reforms
UN agencies, the EU, the U.S., and others fund long-running programs to strengthen investigations, prosecutions, and juvenile responses to violent extremism — for example STRIVE juvenile projects and multi‑phase criminal justice support to Nigeria [2]. The intent is to shift from purely kinetic responses to rule‑of‑law approaches; however, human rights monitoring finds delayed trials, detention of children, and weak accountability for security‑force abuses, undercutting legitimacy and the evidence base for long‑term reduction in violence [2] [5].
3. Prevention, development and community reconciliation programs
International proposals emphasize stabilizing rural areas, addressing land and resource disputes between herders and farmers, and funding reintegration and gender‑sensitive programming to reduce recruitment and communal flareups [8] [7]. Humanitarian and development agencies warn that millions require assistance and that unresolved grievances over grazing, natural resources and political exclusion feed communal violence [7] [3]. Evaluation evidence is mixed: localized reconciliation and livelihoods projects can lower incentives for violence but rarely scale to fill governance vacuums where militants exploit illicit economies [3] [9].
4. Regional diplomacy, cross‑border cooperation and troop deployments
European Parliament motions and analysts call for coordinated regional responses — noting deployments like Chadian troops and the strategic importance of Lake Chad and border areas — and urging neighbouring states to sustain presence to deny insurgent havens [8] [1]. The record indicates regional cooperation can blunt cross‑border sanctuaries temporarily, but withdrawals or uncoordinated pullbacks have precipitated civilian flight and renewed attacks, showing fragility of gains without sustained, multilateral arrangements [8] [1].
5. Critiques, political narratives and unintended consequences
Policy prescriptions arrive with competing narratives and agendas: some foreign lawmakers frame the crisis primarily as religious persecution to press hardline counterterror measures [6], while think‑tanks highlight ethnicity, criminality and resource competition as central drivers, cautioning against reductive religious framings that skew policy [10]. Independent monitors document risks of human rights violations by security forces and warn that ignoring accountability negates the effectiveness of international support [5] [4]. Additionally, the convergence of criminal banditry and jihadism in the northwest shows that militarized responses alone struggle against hybrid, resource‑funded groups [9].
Conclusion — what works, and what remains unknown
International options are clear and complementary — security assistance, justice sector reform, prevention and regional coordination — but the evidence of durable effectiveness is limited: tactical successes are real, institutional and political flaws are pervasive, and programs often fail to address root causes or to scale; accountability and sustained, locally legitimate governance appear decisive for lasting impact [4] [2] [3]. Where reporting lacks hard, causal evaluations of scaled prevention programs and long‑term impact, the limits of public evidence mean confidence in any single policy as a silver bullet is unwarranted [2] [3].