How have political violence rates varied between Democrats and Republicans historically

1. How scholars measure “who” commits political violence — and why that matters

Researchers use two very different approaches: opinion surveys that ask whether violence is “sometimes justified” and event datasets that record actual attacks and fatalities. Surveys can show similar levels of justification across partisans at certain times — for example, some studies found Democrats and Republicans were “extremely close” in endorsing violence between 2017–2020 — but those same studies warn responses depend on question phrasing, timing, and respondent engagement ^{[6] [5]}. Event datasets, by contrast, suggest a heavier toll from right‑wing attackers on recent deadly incidents, but compiling and classifying events also requires judgment calls about motive and scope ^{[2] [3]}.

2. The empirical pattern: opinions versus incidents

Multiple sources report that attitudes and incidents diverge. National surveys and longitudinal work find sizable minorities in both parties who say political violence can be justified under some circumstances and show shifting partisan peaks (e.g., spikes among Republicans around Trump’s impeachment) ^{[6] [7]}. But incident tallies and analyses of terrorism and extremist violence show a higher number of deadly events attributable to right‑wing actors in recent years, and right‑wing incidents have often been deadlier historically ^{[3] [2]}.

3. Geography and aggregation change the headline

Analysts warn that whether you look at states, counties, cities, or individual attackers transforms the result. One review shows Democratic areas appear worse at the county level while Republican-governed states look worse at the state level; researchers say these discrepancies reflect population density, urban crime concentrations, and selection choices — not a simple red‑vs‑blue moral tally ^[4]. This means policymakers and journalists can reach opposing conclusions from the same underlying data by changing the unit of analysis ^[4].

4. Polarization and identity as common drivers across parties

Multiple studies cited in the sources identify partisan identity strength and perceived threat as core predictors of support for violence — and these traits exist on both sides. Research finds the most partisan, most aggrieved individuals in either party are likeliest to accept violence, so the phenomenon is not confined to one party in principle even if recent deadly incidents skew rightward ^{[6] [8] [9]}.

5. Who perceives which party as more violent — public opinion and politics

Public opinion shows partisan lenses shape blame: large segments of Democrats view Republicans as more prone to political violence, while many Republicans say the reverse; overall concern about political violence is high across the electorate (Navigator, Pew) ^{[10] [11]}. Polls also show perceptions can shift after high‑profile attacks, underscoring how episodic events drive partisan narratives ^{[12] [10]}.

6. Recent expert consensus and caveats

Prominent think tanks and scholars (CSIS, START, FactCheck summaries) conclude left‑wing violence has risen from very low baselines but remains lower than recent right‑wing and Islamist violence in the U.S.; they stress that both sides present risks and that counterterrorism must be ideologically broad ^{[13] [14] [15]}. Analysts also caution that taxonomy matters: “left‑wing” and “right‑wing” labels do not map perfectly onto party membership and can miss lone actors or hybrid motives ^{[15] [13]}.

7. What’s missing or uncertain in current reporting

Available sources do not mention a single, authoritative longitudinal dataset that perfectly reconciles survey attitudes, event counts, motive coding, and geographical aggregation over multiple decades; instead, the literature relies on competing datasets and methods that yield different emphases ^{[4] [5]}. That gap means definitive, party‑level historical “rates” are elusive and contingent on research design ^[4].

Conclusion — practical reading of the record

Read two things into the evidence: attitudes that tolerate political violence are present in both parties at different times and among certain subgroups, and event‑level research and expert assessments in recent years show right‑wing actors have committed more of the deadliest politically motivated attacks in the modern U.S. era. Both findings are supported in the sources, but their policy implications differ depending on whether one prioritizes altering public attitudes, disrupting violent networks, or targeting specific threats — choices that reflect political and institutional agendas ^{[6] [3] [13]}.