Political violence over time in the us

1. A recent spike built on decade-long trends

Multiple analyses place the current rise in the context of a longer post‑2016 increase: Reuters and others counted roughly 300 partisan-driven attacks and plots between Jan. 6, 2021 and the 2024 election, and trackers used by academics report substantially higher incident rates in recent years compared with the prior quarter-century ^{[1] [6]}. The Journal of Democracy and Princeton’s Bridging Divides Initiative point to structural shifts—party realignment, social fragmentation, distrust in institutions—that have created a latent predisposition to political violence that can be triggered by events or rhetoric ^{[7] [8]}.

2. Who is perpetrating violence — the data and the debate

Historically, experts identify the deadliest and most frequent political violence as coming from the right—especially white-supremacist and far‑right actors—but multiple 2025 data reviews note an increase in left‑wing attacks and plots, with CSIS finding that 2025 marks the first time in more than 30 years that left‑wing terrorist attacks outnumbered violent far‑right attacks in their dataset through July 4, 2025 ^{[6] [9]}. FactCheck.org and other outlets emphasize the complexity: political violence now spans the ideological spectrum and the balance can shift year to year depending on specific incidents and targets ^[9].

3. New patterns: vigilantes, organized groups and targeting of institutions

Trend analysts at Bridging Divides highlight rising vigilante activity and the prospect of organized violent mobilization returning, while ACLED’s U.S. monitoring flagged waves of demonstrations in 2020 and continuing volatility into later years—signaling that both spontaneous and organized forms of violence are present ^{[8] [10]}. The White House and Brookings briefings underscore that threats increasingly target election officials, judges, and lawmakers, producing assassination attempts and bomb threats that threaten democratic functions ^{[11] [4]}.

4. Media, rhetoric and the “permission structure” question

Scholars and analysts argue leaders’ rhetoric matters. The Journal of Democracy stresses that when political leaders denounce violence from their own side, it can de‑escalate; by contrast, political speech that tolerates or lauds violence creates a “permission structure” that increases risk ^[7]. Brookings and other commentators tie inflammatory public statements and disinformation to the current environment, and the White House has framed some recent violence as the product of organized campaigns and amplification mechanisms ^{[4] [11]}.

5. Public perception, fear and political consequences

Surveys show most Americans believe politically motivated violence is increasing and many expect it to continue; POLITICO and Pew found large shares of the public fear future assassinations and perceive both left‑ and right‑wing extremism as major problems—views that vary by party and broader mood ^{[12] [3]}. Those perceptions feed into policy debates over law enforcement tools, designation of organizations, and civil‑liberties tradeoffs, a tension noted across reporting ^{[11] [9]}.

6. What the datasets don’t settle — limitations and competing readings

Data sources differ in definitions (terrorism vs. politically motivated attacks), timeframes, and coverage; CSIS assembled a dataset of 750 attacks/plots from 1994 to July 4, 2025, while other trackers emphasize different incident classes, making direct comparisons fraught ^[6]. FactCheck.org warns that it’s hard to definitively say whether 2025 is a unique inflection without full-year, harmonized data, and some government reports and removals of past analyses add confusion to trend interpretation ^{[9] [2]}.

7. Policy responses and proposed remedies

Analysts across Brookings, Princeton BDI, and the White House recommend a mix of law‑enforcement disruption, community resilience, better threat monitoring, and leaders’ rhetoric changes to reduce incentives for violence; they disagree on emphasis (criminal enforcement vs. community prevention) and on whether designating groups (e.g., as domestic terrorist organizations) is effective or legally fraught ^{[4] [8] [11]}.

Conclusion — a mixed picture with clear risks

Reporting and datasets agree political violence in the U.S. is higher now than in many recent years and that the phenomenon is multi‑causal and ideologically mixed; however, exact magnitudes and partisan attribution vary by source and definition, so careful, harmonized data collection and clearer public accounting are required to guide effective, rights‑respecting responses ^{[1] [6] [9]}.