What do polls say Gazans prefer for governance and security arrangements post-2023 conflict?
Executive summary
Polling conducted since the October 7, 2023 war shows Gazans divided but pragmatically leaning toward alternatives to exclusive Hamas rule: many polls record a clear majority preference for some form of Palestinian Authority (PA) role or for outside technical/Arab involvement in governance and security, even as significant numbers still expect or support Hamas in various measures [1] [2] [3]. At the same time, Gazans express deep mistrust of externally imposed “day after” plans and strong demand for Palestinian-led solutions, including elected institutions and internal reforms [4] [2].
1. Gazans' short-term pragmatism: favoring PA officials or experts to restore order
Multiple surveys find a robust appetite among Gazans for PA administration or the deployment of Palestinian security officials to restore civil order, with one prominent July 2023 survey showing roughly 70% support for PA officials and security officers taking over administration if Hamas gave up separate armed units [1]. PCPSR tracking likewise records rising Gazan openness to the PA’s return—even under Mahmoud Abbas—and to alternatives framed as technocratic or expert-led management, with over a quarter explicitly favoring a reconstituted PA with elected institutions in 2024 [3] [2].
2. Appetite for Arab involvement and hybrid arrangements, but resistance to delinking Gaza from Palestinian politics
Polls indicate strong Gazan receptivity to Arab states playing a role in peacemaking and post-war arrangements—large majorities endorse more active Arab engagement—and many respondents accept Arab security or oversight in the short term, yet resist solutions that would permanently sever Gaza from Palestinian political structures [5] [6]. Even when independent committees or international “panels of experts” are presented as options, Gazans often prefer arrangements that keep Gaza linked to Palestinian institutions rather than fully external governance [7] [6].
3. Distrust of external plans and demand for Palestinian autonomy in the “day after”
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) finds that Gazans express significant distrust toward externally driven “day after” plans and emphasize the need for Palestinian control over Gaza’s future; PCPSR’s releases consistently highlight Gazan preference for autonomous Palestinian control and skepticism of schemes perceived as externally imposed [4]. Analysts warn that labeling governance as merely “technocratic” obscures Gazans’ insistence that any arrangement be Palestinian-led and capable of guaranteeing security and basic services [8].
4. Residual support for Hamas, divergent expectations, and the security credibility question
Despite growing frustration with Hamas governance—reflected in declining trust metrics in some pre-war and post-war surveys—substantial portions of Gazans still expect or believe Hamas will prevail, and some polls show lingering support for resistance narratives that bolster Hamas’s legitimacy in the population [9] [2] [10]. Foreign Affairs and other analyses caution that any PA or technocratic alternative faces a credibility gap on security: Gazans may reject a civilian administration perceived as unable to protect them from renewed Israeli operations, which helps explain continued pragmatic support for groups that can provide order [8].
5. Polling limitations and what they imply for policy
The polling landscape is heterogeneous in timing, question wording, and sample frames—PCPSR, AWRAD, Washington Institute analyses and others were conducted at different points across 2023–2025—so precise majorities vary by poll and moment, and conclusions must be read as snapshots amid intense upheaval rather than permanent mandates [2] [11] [1]. The consistent pattern across surveys is nonetheless clear: Gazans want security, basic services, elections, and Palestinian stewardship of any post-war governance, are open to PA or Arab-assisted security in the short term, but resist being cut off from Palestinian politics and remain uncertain about which actor can reliably deliver protection and reconstruction [4] [5] [3].