Fact check: Can the President veto a continuing resolution passed by Congress?

1. Why the veto question matters now — shutdown specter and a CR on the way

A continuing resolution is a short-term funding measure Congress uses to prevent a government shutdown, and recent reporting documented the House passing a CR intended to fund through fiscal 2025 end; that measure needed to clear the Senate and then would be presented to the President, who could sign or veto it ^[1]. A veto at that stage would directly risk a shutdown if no alternative majority-backed or bipartisan solution emerged. Coverage also notes Senate procedural hurdles like the 60-vote cloture threshold, meaning a CR can fail for reasons beyond presidential action, yet the final decision point remains the President’s desk ^{[1] [3]}.

2. Constitutional baseline — the President’s veto power is broad and applies to budgets

The constitutional framework gives the President authority to approve or return (veto) any bill passed by both houses, including appropriations and continuing resolutions; contemporary analyses explicitly state that the President’s veto power extends to federal budget legislation ^[2]. That authority has been exercised repeatedly in budget fights, and the legal mechanics are settled: a vetoed CR returns to Congress, where an override requires a two-thirds vote in both chambers. Coverage of past shutdowns and budget standoffs underscores this structural reality and the predictable leverage it creates ^{[3] [2]}.

3. Political context: why executives sometimes resist or circumvent funding laws

Reporting indicates administrations sometimes withhold or reprioritize funds even after Congress appropriates them, which critics call “backdoor cuts,” and such practices deepen distrust between the executive and legislative branches ^[4]. This politicized handling of funds informs debates about vetoes because opponents argue a veto is a straightforward constitutional tool, while supporters of administrative adjustments frame them as executive discretion in execution. Both actions—formal vetoes and administrative funding choices—affect government operations, but only the veto is an explicit constitutional check with a clear congressional remedy ^{[4] [2]}.

4. Legal and procedural counters — override difficulty and Senate filibuster dynamics

Even though Congress can override a presidential veto, the practical hurdle is substantial: overriding requires two-thirds majorities in both chambers, a high bar in a polarized era. Recent reporting emphasized the Senate’s 60-vote cloture rule as an additional gatekeeper for CR passage, meaning a veto can be decisive only if Congress cannot unite to overcome it or find an alternative compromise ^[1]. Thus the theoretical power to override exists, but the political arithmetic often makes the President’s veto effectively final unless bipartisan consensus forms or strategic concessions are made ^{[1] [3]}.

5. Sources and reliability — reading the coverage with caution

The pieces cited vary in focus and reliability: several explicitly state the President can veto budget legislation ^[2], while others describe procedural dynamics without stating the veto principle outright ^{[3] [1]}. One source noted as unavailable cannot be used to assess the claim ^[5]. Treat each report as partial and politically contextualized: outlets frame vetoes as constitutional powers, political leverage, or administrative abuse depending on perspective, so triangulating across sources produces the clearest picture ^{[4] [6]}.

6. Big-picture takeaway and what’s often omitted by coverage

The constitutional fact is simple: a President can veto a continuing resolution, and Congress can only override with two-thirds votes in both chambers; contemporary reporting confirms both the action and its real-world political consequences ^{[2] [1]}. What’s less frequently explored is the downstream operational impact—how a veto interacts with agency contingency plans, partial funding authorities, and executive withholding practices—which can matter as much as the veto itself in producing service interruptions or policy shifts ^{[4] [3]}.