Fact check: What formal constitutional and statutory powers does the President have to avert or end a federal government shutdown in 2025?

1. The headline claim: the Presidency versus the Power of the Purse

The central claim extracted from the materials is that Congress holds the constitutional “power of the purse,” and that constrains the President’s ability to unilaterally stop a shutdown. The Analyses repeatedly identify the Appropriations Clause and the Anti‑Deficiency Act as the legal boundaries that prevent the executive from simply spending without statutory authority ^{[1] [3]}. Sources also note assertions that the Trump White House has sought to expand executive control over spending via rescissions or emergency declarations, but legal scholars and statutes show those avenues are constrained; courts have intervened in past disputes over executive reallocation of funds ^{[5] [2]}. The competing claims reflect a tension between political capacity to negotiate and the legal limits on unilateral executive action ^{[4] [1]}.

2. What the Constitution and statutes actually allow — a narrow legal map

Under the Constitution and federal statutes, the President cannot lawfully spend money without an appropriation from Congress; the Anti‑Deficiency Act forbids obligating federal funds absent authorization and creates criminal and civil remedies for violations ^[1]. The Appropriations Clause vests Congress with the exclusive power to authorize expenditures, which is the structural reason why lapses in appropriation lead to agency furloughs and halted functions ^{[1] [3]}. Scholars and government analyses underline that while the President retains constitutional duties (national defense, foreign relations) and can order certain ongoing functions to continue, those continuations must fall within statutory exceptions for emergencies or be funded by prior appropriations — they do not create a general power to override a funding lapse ^{[1] [6]}.

3. The President’s statutory tool chest — what can and can’t be used

The executive does possess some statutory authorities that can affect spending flows: veto power over appropriations bills, the ability to propose rescissions of unobligated funds under the Impoundment Control Act, targeted reprogramming within agency limits, and certain emergency authorities that unlock specific resources when a national emergency is declared ^{[4] [2] [1]}. These tools are procedurally constrained: rescissions require congressional consent or a special process, reprogramming is limited by appropriation language and agency rules, and emergency powers under laws like the National Emergencies Act activate distinct statutory authorities but do not confer a blanket power to spend beyond appropriations ^{[2] [4]}. Legal challenges and congressional pushback frequently follow executive attempts to reroute funds, as recent reporting indicates ^[5].

4. Emergency declarations — big headline power, small practical reach

Emergency powers are frequently cited as potential ways to avert operational collapse, and the executive can declare national emergencies that release certain statutory authorities, including procurement and reallocation tools ^[2]. However, historical practice and legal commentary show those powers are fragmented and legally vulnerable: many emergency authorities are specific in scope, lack clear funding authorities that would bypass appropriations, and courts have sometimes limited executive overreach — making emergency declarations an uncertain route to end a shutdown ^{[2] [5]}. Moreover, opponents and some legal scholars frame broad emergency use as an attempt to circumvent Congress, which signals likely legislative and judicial resistance and can produce rapid political costs ^{[2] [4]}.

5. Political instruments often matter more than legal maneuvers

Beyond narrow statutory authorities, the President’s most effective levers are political and procedural: negotiating with congressional leaders, endorsing or rejecting continuing resolutions, and using the veto to shape bills. The Administration’s public posture and bargaining — including threats to cut or rescind spending and public appeals to swing legislators — are recurring tactics in 2025 reporting ^{[4] [7]}. These measures do not change the legal architecture but can force a legislative resolution; empirical accounts of shutdowns emphasize that compromise in Congress, not unilateral executive action, historically ended previous shutdowns ^{[3] [1]}.

6. Bottom line: legal limits, political options, and predictable litigation

The bottom-line fact is that the President cannot lawfully end a government shutdown by simply ordering spending beyond what Congress appropriated; realistic executive options are negotiation, vetoes, limited rescissions or reprogramming subject to law, and narrow emergency authorities that often invite legal challenges ^{[1] [2] [4]}. Multiple sources highlight that aggressive executive attempts to reallocate funds in 2025 prompted litigation and Congressional countermeasures, demonstrating that the practical path out of a shutdown remains legislative action coupled with political compromise ^{[5] [7]}. Observers should therefore treat claims of sweeping unilateral presidential power to end a shutdown as overstated; the factual record shows structural legal limits and high political — and judicial — friction around any executive workaround ^{[1] [2]}.