What would be the congressional and judicial steps if a vice president and cabinet invoked Section 4 against a president?

1. Invocation: the administrative start that takes effect immediately

The formal triggering step is a written declaration from the vice president and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments stating that the president is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office”; upon transmission to the Speaker and President pro tempore the vice president “shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President”—an immediate transfer of authority distinct from impeachment ^{[1] [2]}. Section 4 is designed for situations where the president will not or cannot declare incapacity under Section 3; its text places central importance on the vice president’s participation and a majority of Cabinet officers ^{[1] [2]}.

2. The congressional clock: 21 days and a supermajority test

Once Congress receives the Cabinet’s written declaration, it has 21 days to act (or, if not in session, 21 days after it is required to assemble) and must then determine by a two‑thirds vote in both the House and the Senate that the president is unable to discharge the office’s powers and duties for the acting‑president status to continue; failing that supermajority, the president resumes authority ^[1]. That high two‑thirds threshold deliberately makes sustaining a Section 4 removal politically arduous—intended as a check on impulsive uses of administrative power—but it also means that partisan composition of Congress will likely determine outcome in practice ^{[1] [3]}.

3. Judicial role: what the sources show and what they do not

The reporting provided details the constitutional text and the congressional timetable but does not establish a settled role for the federal courts in reviewing Section 4 disputes; the sources describe congressional determination as the operative check and note the amendment’s procedures without outlining a definitive path for judicial intervention ^{[1] [2]}. Because Section 4 has never been invoked, and the amendment leaves key terms such as “unable” undefined, courts could be asked to resolve disputes if invoked in contested circumstances, but the sources do not document any precedent or binding judicial framework for such review ^{[2] [1]}.

4. Impeachment as the parallel or follow‑up avenue

Scholars and commentators emphasize that Section 4 is a temporary, emergency mechanism; if the goal is permanent removal, the constitutional remedy remains impeachment in the House and conviction in the Senate, which can remove and disqualify an officer for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors—Congress’s established power under Article II and Article I procedures ^{[4] [5] [3]}. Several sources argue that using Section 4 against a president who is lucid and politically embattled risks producing only a short‑term sidelining unless impeachment accompanies or follows the invocation ^[1].

5. Political, legal and practical uncertainties—why Section 4 is a high‑risk tool

Because Section 4 has never been used, commentators warn of hazards: ambiguity about the factual standard for “inability,” risks of political backlash if used against a conscious president, and the prospect that Congress’s supermajority requirement effectively turns the procedure into a political decision rather than a purely medical or legal determination; those caveats are drawn from constitutional analyses noting the amendment’s text and historical absence of Section 4 precedent ^{[1] [2] [6]}. The sources make clear that the amendment’s designers intended continuity of government in extreme cases, but they also left critical judgments to political actors whose incentives and interpretations vary ^{[1] [6]}.