What Presidents have disliked/dis-approved of the war powers act?
Executive summary
Most presidents since the War Powers Resolution’s passage in 1973 have resisted or tested it; Congress passed the law over President Richard Nixon’s veto in 1973 [1]. Major modern presidents — including Richard Nixon (who vetoed it), Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and others — have either objected to its constitutionality or acted in ways critics say sidestepped it; reporting and reference works note that presidents “generally resisted or ignored” the statute as an “unconstitutional usurpation” of executive authority [2] [3]. Recent 2025 coverage also frames Donald Trump as the latest president to test war-powers boundaries with strikes conducted without explicit advance congressional authorization [4].
1. Nixon’s veto and the law’s origin — Congress vs. the White House
The War Powers Resolution was enacted by Congress in November 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto; Nixon openly opposed the statute and refused to sign it, which is the clearest documented presidential disapproval at enactment [1]. Contemporary institutional accounts and the Nixon Library emphasize the executive–legislative clash at the law’s creation and subsequent “continuous” executive branch objections, framing the act as a legislative rebuke of expansive wartime presidential practice [5] [1].
2. A pattern of presidential resistance, not a single blacklist
Scholars and reference sources report a broad pattern: “Presidents have generally resisted or ignored the War Powers Act, viewing it as an unconstitutional usurpation of their executive authority” [2]. That phrasing is deliberate: resistance has been institutional and repeated rather than confined to one administration. Sources list multiple post‑1973 incidents — Reagan troop deployments, George H.W. Bush actions, Clinton’s Kosovo/Libya moves, and debates over Panama and elsewhere — as examples where presidents acted without full compliance or where legal scholars disputed compliance [3] [5].
3. Specific presidencies frequently cited as dissenting or evasive
Reporting and activist guides call out several administrations for contesting the Resolution’s limits. Reagan’s 1981 troop posture in Central America, the 1989 Panama invasion under George H.W. Bush, Clinton’s 1999 Kosovo air campaign and Obama’s 2011 Libya action have all been flagged as contested vis‑à‑vis War Powers requirements [3] [5]. The Congressional Research Service and legal commentators have repeatedly said presidents expanded commander‑in‑chief claims to justify interventions without full congressional authorization [6] [3].
4. Legal and political rationales presidents have used
Presidents and their legal teams typically argue the president retains constitutional authority to direct U.S. forces as commander in chief, or that certain actions (rescue missions, limited strikes, engagements under allied mandates) do not qualify as “hostilities” that trigger the Resolution’s strictest requirements. For example, Jimmy Carter later said the Iran hostage‑rescue attempt didn’t require consultation because it was not an act of war [4]. More recently, House and Senate leaders and allies have argued the law itself is unconstitutional — a view voiced in 2025 by Speaker Mike Johnson in public debate about strikes [7].
5. Bipartisan criticism of presidential circumvention
Despite executive resistance, members of both parties have at times moved to use the Resolution to constrain presidents. In 2025, bipartisan resolutions and floor maneuvers were marshaled to try to force votes limiting military action in Venezuela and Iran; coverage frames these as continuations of the decades‑long tug‑of‑war over who decides war [8] [4]. Activist groups and some members of Congress emphasize the statute’s procedural tools — e.g., the ability of any member to force a floor vote under Section 5(c) — even as administrations test its boundaries [3].
6. What reporting does not show — limits of the available sources
Available sources do not provide a definitive list of every president who “disliked” the War Powers Act as an emotion; instead, they document institutional resistance (vetoes, legal positions, contested deployments) and numerous administrations that tested or ignored parts of the law [2] [3]. Sources do not supply verbatim, comprehensive statements from every president saying “I dislike” the statute; they offer policy positions, veto behavior, legal arguments and examples of noncompliance [1] [2].
7. Takeaway — a recurring constitutional fight, not a settled legal rule
The War Powers Resolution remains a political and legal battleground: Congress enacted it over Nixon’s veto [1]; presidents across administrations have treated it warily or as constitutionally infirm [2]; and contemporary news shows the pattern continues, with each new unilateral strike reviving debates and bipartisan attempts to force congressional checks [4] [8]. Readers should view “which presidents disliked it” less as a roster of personal animus than as a long record of institutional contestation documented in the cited reporting and reference sources [2] [3].