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What are projections for illegal border crossings in the US through 2024?
Executive summary
Projections for “illegal border crossings” through 2024 in the provided reporting are not framed as long‑term statistical forecasts but as measured encounters and short‑term trends: fiscal‑year encounters at all U.S. borders totaled about 2.3 million in FY2024, with U.S.–Mexico irregular encounters falling to roughly 2.1 million (a 14% drop from FY2023) according to Migration Policy [1]. Multiple government releases and policy briefs document sharp month‑to‑month declines after mid‑2024 tied to new U.S. rules and increased Mexican enforcement, but none of the supplied sources present a formal projection model for crossings through the end of calendar 2024 [1] [2] [3].
1. What the data actually report: encounters, not a forecast
Most official and analytical pieces in the results present measured “encounters” (apprehensions, expulsions, inadmissibles), not predictive projections; Migration Policy reports FY2024 totals of about 2.3 million encounters at all borders and ~2.1 million at the U.S.–Mexico border, down 14% from the prior year [1]. CBP’s monthly updates likewise focus on counted encounters and operational indicators — for example, June 2024 Border Patrol encounters dropped 29% from May 2024 [3] — but these are retrospective statistics rather than forward projections [3].
2. Short‑term trend after mid‑2024: steep declines tied to policy changes
Multiple sources link rapid declines in encounters in mid‑ to late‑2024 to U.S. policy actions (Presidential proclamation, Securing the Border rule, CBP One appointments) and coordinated Mexican enforcement. CBP and DHS fact sheets assert decreases of 50–60% in certain metrics (northern border encounters reduced 50% June–September 2024; southwest between‑ports encounters down over 60% May–December 2024) and estimate a ~60% drop in “gotaways” from FY2023 to FY2024 [4] [5] [2]. Migration Policy likewise credits a “carrot‑and‑stick” approach and regional enforcement with a 14% FY decline and lower releases into the U.S. [1].
3. Where political actors use the numbers — and how
House Republicans’ Homeland Security Committee materials emphasize high monthly encounter counts and frame executive programs as enabling releases and a “historic border crisis,” citing CBP April 2024 counts more than 179,000 at the southwest border that month [6]. By contrast, DHS and CBP releases highlight the effectiveness of new restrictions and removals, citing steep percentage declines after June 2024 [3] [5]. Both sides use the same operational data but select different time windows and interpretations; readers should note that emphasis on peak months (late 2023) versus the post‑June 2024 decline produce opposing narratives [6] [3].
4. Independent analysts and cross‑checks: moderation and context
Migration Policy and other nonpartisan analysts place the fall in encounters in a broader hemispheric context — not only U.S. policy but also Mexican efforts and reduced irregular flows through transit countries — and quantify declines (e.g., irregular arrivals down 53% between Dec 2023 and May 2024) while warning about sustainability and humanitarian implications [1] [7]. USAFacts and other data aggregators track monthly detected crossing attempts and show peaks in Dec 2023 followed by declines through 2024, underscoring that counts can be volatile month‑to‑month and that detected encounters do not equal distinct individuals (repeat crossings can inflate totals) [8].
5. Limits of the available reporting: what you will not find here
The supplied sources do not offer formal statistical projections or models that predict total illegal crossings through the end of calendar 2024; they report observed counts, percentage declines, and operational metrics [1] [3] [5]. Likewise, none of the results provide confidence intervals, counterfactual modeling, or causal estimates isolating which policy had the largest effect — analysts infer contributions from multiple measures and from Mexican enforcement [1] [7]. If you want published forecast models (seasonal or scenario‑based projections), those are not found in the current reporting.
6. How to interpret “projections” vs. reported trends going forward
Given the material: short‑term “projections” in public conversation have largely been replaced by near‑real‑time trend statements — e.g., “encounters dropped X% after policy Y” — rather than numerical forecasts for end‑of‑year totals [3] [5] [1]. To produce defensible projections one needs: (a) a clear definition of the metric (encounters, unique individuals, gotaways), (b) a model incorporating policy effects and regional enforcement, and (c) seasonality and repeat‑attempt adjustments — none of which appear as a ready‑made forecast in the supplied sources [8] [9].
If you want, I can: (A) extract month‑by‑month encounter counts from CBP’s FY2024 reports to create a simple time series through December 2024, or (B) summarize competing policy claims with side‑by‑side charts of peak vs. post‑June 2024 declines using the cited sources. Which would you prefer?