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What are the most prominent domestic terrorism groups in the US since 2020?
Executive Summary
Since 2020, U.S. authorities and analysts identify white‑supremacist and racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and anti‑government or “anti‑authority” violent extremists as the most prominent domestic terrorism threats, with violent incidents concentrated around firearms and targeting government, law enforcement, minority communities, and symbolic institutions. Reporting and oversight groups also highlight limitations and gaps in official data, contested labeling practices, and the role of lone‑actor and networked actors inspired by both domestic and foreign extremist ideologies, producing divergent portrayals of which organizations are “most prominent” [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. How federal agencies and think tanks define the threat — a shifting landscape
Federal reporting and national security think tanks converge on white‑supremacist RMVEs and anti‑government DVEs as the dominant domestic terrorism concerns since 2020, noting increases in investigations and incidents involving firearms. The CSIS dataset and public analyses indicate that between 2020–2021 there were dozens of plots and attacks tied to these ideologies, with fatalities concentrated in a relatively small number of high‑casualty events and many additional lower‑level plots disrupted or unexecuted. The Department of Homeland Security and GAO assessments emphasize that ideology categories drive how incidents are tallied and prioritized, which affects public perception and resource allocation [2] [3].
2. Who counts as a “group”? The problem of labels and lone actors
The term “group” is contested: official lists rarely publish neat organizational rankings because much domestic terrorism since 2020 involves leaderless networks, small cells, and lone actors who draw on white‑supremacist or anti‑state doctrine rather than formal membership. The FBI’s wanted pages list individuals with ties to named movements like Aryan Nations but do not provide a wholesale inventory of domestic organizations; oversight researchers note agencies have doubled domestic‑terrorism investigations without producing transparent, disaggregated group lists, complicating attempts to name a definitive set of “most prominent” groups [5] [4].
3. Evidence points to white‑supremacist violence as the top persistent threat
Multiple sources, including Wikipedia summaries of federal assessments and CSIS analysis, identify white‑supremacist extremism as the top domestic terrorism threat in the period since 2020, both in terms of fatalities and the ambition of plots. These incidents often target racial, ethnic, and religious minority communities, and increasingly use firearms as the weapon of choice. Analysts underscore that while some high‑profile plots involve organized cells, much of the danger arises from decentralized actors radicalized online and through social movements, amplifying risk even when formal group structures are weak or absent [1] [2].
4. Anti‑government and far‑right militias remain central but heterogeneous
Anti‑government and militia‑style actors compose a diverse and persistent stream of threats: some operate as organized militias with paramilitary training, while others are ad‑hoc networks or individuals motivated by conspiratorial anti‑authority beliefs. Government programs and researchers have flagged these actors for involvement in plots against government and police targets, and for mobilizing around events that catalyze violence. Oversight voices and reporting also point out that designation and enforcement practices — including alleged mislabeling of certain veteran groups — have provoked controversy, raising questions about criteria and civil liberties [6] [7] [4].
5. Data gaps, differing missions, and political frictions shape the public story
Available analyses agree that data limitations and institutional incentives shape what is called “prominent.” GAO and civil‑liberty groups note incomplete DOJ reporting and variable agency transparency, while political actors have at times accused the FBI of overreach or underreporting depending on the target. These frictions influence which groups appear in public narratives and policy responses. The resulting picture is one where operational activity and lethality point toward RMVEs and anti‑government actors as the core threats, yet debate persists about how to classify, prioritize, and label organizations versus individuals in public and legal fora [3] [4] [7].