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Fact check: What disinformation has Putin spread?
Executive Summary
Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-aligned networks have driven a multifaceted disinformation campaign that mixes state media control, covert social-media operations, pre-emptive blame narratives for atrocities, and targeted smear campaigns against foreign leaders to weaken support for Ukraine and influence elections across Europe. Reporting from multiple outlets between September 8–29, 2025 documents these tactics being used in the Czech Republic, Moldova, Germany and in narratives justifying the invasion of Ukraine [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].
1. How Moscow’s networks moved into European elections and public opinion
Reporting shows coordinated efforts to inject pro‑Russian propaganda into national elections and public discourse, notably in the Czech Republic and Moldova, where actors used social platforms and paid actors to amplify false narratives and undermine pro‑Ukraine positions. The Czech account highlights an increase in pro‑Russian content ahead of elections aimed at eroding democratic support for Kyiv and boosting sympathetic politicians [1]. In Moldova a BBC probe found a secret network tied to oligarch Ilan Shor using TikTok and Facebook to seed disinformation and pay participants for fake postings, demonstrating a deliberate operational model to shift narratives [2].
2. The Kremlin’s playbook: controlling media and manufacturing excuses
Analysts trace modern Russian information strategy to state takeover of independent outlets and creation of “information alibis” that preempt accountability for violent acts. The 2000 Kremlin takeover of NTV set a precedent for media suppression and centralized messaging that persists today, enabling the state to mobilize narratives quickly and intimidate dissenting outlets [6]. Separate reporting documents how propagandists preemptively blamed Ukraine for attacks like the Mariupol maternity ward and theatre bombings, a tactic to create deniability and confuse international responses [5].
3. Smear campaigns that target leaders to reshape Europe’s politics
Kremlin disinformation explicitly targeted individual politicians; Germany’s Friedrich Merz was subject to fabricated stories — including a widely reported fake about shooting polar bears — intended to portray him as unfit and extreme while boosting sympathy for parties advocating closer ties to Moscow [3]. These narratives dovetail with efforts to strengthen or normalize leaders perceived as less hostile to Russian interests, feeding a broader strategic aim of fragmenting EU consensus on Ukraine and sanctions.
4. High-level assessments: intelligence and political framing
High-level Western voices interpret these actions as purposeful deceit aimed at sustaining conflict and avoiding negotiated peace on terms unfavorable to Moscow. Britain’s MI6 chief stated that Putin “lies to the world” and has no interest in a negotiated peace, framing disinformation as part of a wider policy to impose Russian will and destabilize opponents [7]. Parallel reporting found Putin publicly framing the invasion as a “righteous battle,” using state messaging to justify operations and claim battlefield success, reinforcing domestic support [4].
5. Tactical trends: social platforms, paid actors, and narrative preemption
Field reporting identifies recurring tactics: use of social media platforms (TikTok, Facebook), paid or incentivized posters, and pre-bunking blame for Kremlin operations to shape immediate public perception. The Moldova network paid participants to post fabricated content, showing a transactional model to manufacture visibility and virality [2]. Preemptive narratives were also used around civilian-targeted incidents to muddy accountability and slow international consensus on responses [5].
6. Motives and strategic aims visible across sources
Across the examined reporting, the strategic throughline is consistent: weaken Western unity, erode support for Ukraine, and enable domestic and allied political actors who are sympathetic or indifferent to Moscow’s goals. In the Czech context, the objective was to undermine democracy and pro‑Ukraine policy; in Europe broadly, targeted disinformation sought to discredit firm supporters of Ukraine and elevate voices favoring rapprochement [1] [3]. Intelligence and journalistic accounts frame these as coordinated elements of Russian state strategy [7] [4].
7. Disagreements, limitations and possible agendas in reporting
Sources converge on core tactics but differ in emphasis: investigative pieces focus on operational detail and actors like Ilan Shor to show mechanics [2], while intelligence and opinion pieces emphasize strategic intent and moral culpability [7] [4]. Coverage of incidents such as preemptive blame for atrocities is framed as both tactical misdirection and an attempt to shape legal and diplomatic outcomes; this framing risks conflating propaganda with battlefield information volatility but consistently points to systematic Kremlin direction [5] [6].
8. What the mosaic of reports establishes and what remains unresolved
Taken together, reporting from September 8–29, 2025 establishes a pattern: media control, covert online networks, targeted smear campaigns, and pre-bunking narratives are central to Kremlin disinformation operations across Europe and regarding Ukraine. Open questions remain about the precise command-and-control links between Moscow and specific networks, the full scale of paid influence operations, and the measurable electoral impact in each country; these require continued investigative and intelligence work to quantify and attribute definitively [1] [2] [6].