What recent incidents or groups in the UK indicate a rise in fascist activity?
Executive summary
Recent incidents across 2023–2026 — notably the summer 2024 riots after the Southport killing, large anti-asylum demonstrations such as Crowborough in January 2026, and a pattern of organised far‑right fitness and “active club” networks — provide concrete signals that fascist-style mobilisation in the UK has resurged in both street violence and community organising [1] [2] [3]. Multiple groups and new party projects — Patriotic Alternative, the Homeland Party, Advance UK and networks linked to Tommy Robinson and the English Defence League — are repeatedly named in reporting and academic analysis as central actors in this rise [4] [5] [2] [6].
1. Riots and street violence: the summer 2024 wave that reignited alarms
A series of right‑wing to far‑right riots that began in Southport on 29 July 2024 and then spread to other English towns and Northern Ireland involved racist attacks, arson and looting and has been identified in multiple sources as the worst disorder since 2011 — an outbreak that anti‑fascist groups, researchers and mainstream reporting link to far‑right mobilisation online and on the streets [1] [7]. These disturbances were fuelled less by formal command structures than by social‑media personalities and encrypted Telegram networks tying together EDL supporters, Patriotic Alternative activists, Britain First and other legacy far‑right groups, according to reporting and aggregated research [1] [6].
2. Organised movements and parties showing renewed reach
Patriotic Alternative — long described by watchdogs as the UK’s largest organised fascist group — has been a focal point, but factional splits produced the Homeland Party (registered January 2024) and the emergence of political vehicles such as Advance UK, linked in reporting to Tommy Robinson, demonstrating a shift from pure street activism to attempts at electoral legitimacy and local organising [4] [5] [2]. The Homeland Party and its founders have been publicly connected to recruitment of influencers and cross‑European far‑right networks, and Homeland figures and Advance UK speakers were noted at the Crowborough anti‑asylum march in January 2026 [8] [2].
3. Decentralised “active clubs”, online organising and new tactics
A notable development is the spread of decentralised “active clubs” that package white‑nationalist ideology as fitness and male‑bonding culture, recruiting through Telegram channels with thousands of subscribers and borrowing inspiration from US street‑fighting groups — tactics that make mobilisation more diffuse and harder to police [3]. Researchers and activists also documented fascist use of encrypted channels to share violent targets and to circulate hit‑lists, including a leaked fascist list of over 100 law firms providing services to refugees in 2024, signalling an escalation from rhetoric to targeted intimidation [6].
4. Evidence of growth balanced by fragmentation and institutional limits
Although reporting and academic studies show sustained activism and some organisational growth — and convictions for terrorism linked to proscribed groups such as National Action underline the security risk — the movement is also fragmented: splits (Patriotic Alternative → Homeland), frequent rebranding, and repeated failures to translate street power into broad electoral success suggest limits to political mainstreaming [9] [4] [5]. Analysts caution that while violent episodes and online recruitment rose sharply around mid‑2024, much activity remains subcultural and decentralised rather than a unified national fascist movement [9] [3].
5. Political context, narratives and who benefits from attention
The surge in mobilisation has been fed by an Islamophobic turn in public discourse at specific moments (for example after the 2023–24 Gaza war and other flashpoints) and by political rhetoric around immigration that far‑right groups exploit to normalise hostility and recruit [7] [10]. Anti‑fascist organisers and trade unions have mobilised large counter‑demonstrations, but media framing and some advocacy groups may amplify particular episodes for political ends; reporting organisations like Stand Up To Racism focus on disruption by far‑right actors, while other commentators emphasise fragmentation and the difficulty of labelling all far‑right activity as “fascist” [11] [2] [7].
6. What the sources do—and do not—establish
The supplied reporting and scholarship collectively establish that violent riots in 2024, targeted local protests in 2026, the rise of Active Club networks, and the formation and registration of groups such as Homeland and Advance UK are concrete indicators of a recent upswing in organised fascist‑style activity in the UK [1] [2] [3] [5]. The material does not provide exhaustive national statistics on membership growth or a single, unified hierarchy coordinating all events; where claims extend beyond these sources, reporting limits preclude firm assertion [9] [4].