What regional and demographic factors best predict support for populist candidates in recent U.S. elections?
Executive summary
Regional geography and local economic conditions—especially the urban‑rural divide and measures of economic insecurity—are the strongest predictors of recent U.S. support for populist candidates, while demographic correlates (lower formal education, higher shares of white voters, male gender, and certain religious communities such as white evangelicals) and turnout dynamics amplify those geographic effects; supply‑side factors like outsider status and competitive races also shape where populists run and win [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. The geographic fault lines: urban, rural and the county map of populist gains
Recent analyses show the urban‑rural divide remains central: rural voters tilted more heavily toward right‑wing populists in 2024 and that divide even widened compared with prior cycles, with rural areas favoring the Republican populist by larger margins [1]; detailed vote‑file work also documents regional shifts—rural support patterns changed modestly across battleground regions between 2020 and 2024, underscoring geography’s persistent explanatory power [5].
2. Local immigrant composition and county‑level swings
Beyond a simple rural/urban split, county‑level demographic composition mattered: counties with larger immigrant shares were among those that swung more toward the right‑wing populist in 2024, suggesting populist appeals linked to immigration and cultural threat narratives resonated in diverse local contexts as well as homogeneous ones [6].
3. Economic insecurity and the demand for populism
Scholars find economic insecurity is a robust demand‑side predictor: politicians facing electorates with higher economic hardship are more likely to deploy populist strategies, and voters in economically insecure places are more receptive to populist messages—especially when races are close and candidates are outsiders [2]. Cross‑cutting evidence about income inequality and perceptions of unfairness further links material grievances and populist appeal, though causal pathways vary by context [7] [8].
4. Demographic predictors: education, race, gender, religion and age
Lower formal education correlates with greater populist support in diaspora and U.S. contexts alike—research on Latin American diasporas in the U.S. predicts more educated groups will be less likely to back populists, a pattern echoed in U.S. studies that isolate education as a key predictor [3] [9]. Racial dynamics matter: white voters, especially white men, provided disproportionate support to the 2024 right‑wing populist, while shifts among Black and Latino voters were smaller but politically significant [1]. Religion is salient: analysts highlighted white evangelical voters as pivotal to the 2024 cycle’s populist coalition [4]. Age effects are uneven across datasets, with youth turnout volatility altering the net demographic effect in some contests [5] [10].
5. Turnout, irregular voters and competitive contexts
Empirical accounts emphasize turnout and who shows up as decisive: differential turnout among partisan blocs—Republican‑leaning eligible voters turning out at higher rates in 2024—amplified populist success more than mass shifts in partisan identity [1]. Analysts note irregular or infrequent voters can swing toward populists in certain cycles, so turnout mobilization and irregular‑voter behavior are central to predicting populist outcomes [10] [11].
6. Supply side, institutions and strategic opportunity for populists
Supply‑side factors constrain where populists succeed: outsider candidates and those facing close contests are more likely to adopt populist strategies, and institutional features (primary rules, electoral incentives) shape the opportunities for populist challengers to emerge and consolidate support [2] [12]. Comparative work and global election monitoring also caution that international trends, disinformation, and external interference can tilt conditions in which populists prosper [13].
7. Synthesis and limits of current evidence
Taken together, the best predictors are layered: geography (urban‑rural and county composition), local economic insecurity and immigrant shares, demographic features (lower education, white and male skews, evangelical religiosity), and turnout dynamics—mediated by candidate strategy and institutional context [1] [2] [6] [3] [4]. The sources converge on these factors but differ in emphasis and causal claims; gaps remain in isolating how cultural grievances versus material conditions operate independently, and some claims (e.g., precise causal weight of immigration shares versus economic decline) exceed what the provided reporting definitively establishes [7] [6].