What role did regional migration drivers (Haiti, Venezuela, Central America) play in changing encounter rates under each administration?
Executive summary
Regional drivers in Venezuela, Haiti, and Central America were major engines of the big swings in U.S. border encounters across administrations: Venezuelan political and economic collapse fueled a sharp rise in encounters in 2021–2023, Haitian instability produced distinct patterns of port‑of‑entry arrivals and expulsions, and endemic Central American violence and poverty sustained high family and child encounters—each nationality interacted differently with Biden‑era legal pathways, enforcement tools such as Title 42 and the Secure the Border rule, and the Trump administration’s rollbacks, producing the encounter trends reported in 2021–2025 [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. Venezuela: crisis migration that became a headline driver of encounters
Venezuelan encounters rose dramatically beginning in FY2021 as millions fled Venezuela’s political and economic collapse, with CBP encounters growing from roughly 49,000 in FY2021 to 188,000 in FY2022 and about 266,000 in FY2023, making Venezuelans one of the fastest‑growing national cohorts at the border [2]; many Venezuelans travelled through the Darien Gap and Central America rather than relying on ports of entry, with only about a quarter choosing to present at ports of entry in 2023 [3].
2. Haiti: concentrated port‑of‑entry arrivals and rapid declines after expulsions and policy shifts
Haitian migration showed a distinct pattern of almost exclusively arriving at ports of entry—99 percent in one recent period—and experienced sharp volatility because U.S. expulsions and administrative actions were targeted at Haitian nationals, contributing to large year‑to‑year swings in encounters [3] [1]; encounters with Haitian citizens plunged in 2024 after enforcement and policy changes, falling by roughly 97 percent between December 2023 and August 2024 in Pew’s tally [5].
3. Central America: persistent push factors that kept family and child encounters high
Violence, poverty, and governance failures in the Northern Triangle—Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador—remained steady push factors that sustained large Central American flows and a high share of family and child encounters throughout the period, even as overall encounters shifted; for example, Guatemala and Honduras together accounted for very large encounter counts in FY2021–FY2024 and Central Americans continued to cross irregularly rather than rely on CBP One appointments [1] [4] [3].
4. How Biden’s mix of pathways and restrictions reshaped nationality patterns
The Biden administration’s “carrot‑and‑stick” approach—expanding Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and creating parole pathways (CHNV) while narrowing asylum access for irregular crossers and deploying tools such as CBP One and the Secure the Border rule—moved many Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans toward ports of entry or legal parole and reduced irregular crossings for those nationalities, while Central Americans, less able or willing to wait in Mexico, continued to cross irregularly [2] [4] [3].
5. Trump (post‑2025) and the rapid decline in encounters tied to ending legal programs and hard enforcement)
The incoming Trump administration terminated Biden‑era parole programs (CHNV) and other lawful pathways and emphasized harder‑edged measures that coincided with steep declines in encounters across the region: analyses credit the ending of CHNV with a 92 percent reduction in irregular encounters among those nationalities between October 2022 and December 2024 and note near‑historic lows in early 2025, though observers caution that these declines built on momentum from 2024 measures as well [6] [4].
6. Net effect, caveats and competing explanations
Overall, regional drivers—Venezuelan collapse, Haitian instability, and chronic Central American insecurity—were proximate causes of the nationality composition and timing of the encounter surges, but policy responses shaped how those drivers translated into recorded encounters: legal pathways, expulsions, visa restrictions and app‑based appointments shifted who arrived irregularly versus at ports of entry and when encounters peaked or plunged; analysts stress that enforcement, diplomatic cooperation (e.g., Mexico visa actions), and operational definitions of “encounters” (Title 8 versus expulsions) all influence the counts, and data limitations prevent attributing every swing solely to origin‑country push factors [2] [7] [8] [6].