How did Iran, Palestinian leaders, and other Arab states respond to the Abraham Accords after 2020?
Executive summary
Iran uniformly condemned the Abraham Accords as a betrayal and a strategic threat to the Palestinian cause and regional balance, warning of changed relations with Gulf states and signaling stronger countermeasures [1] [2]. Palestinian leaders broadly denounced the Accords as abandoning the Arab Peace Initiative and recalled envoys or boycotted offers, even while public opinion among Palestinians showed surprising pockets of support in Gaza and East Jerusalem [3] [4]. Other Arab governments adopted pragmatic engagement—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan normalized with Israel and pursued economic and security ties—while regional states and publics remained split and some (notably Saudi, Lebanon, and wider Arab public opinion) resisted or conditioned normalization on Palestinian statehood [5] [6] [7].
1. Iran’s message: denunciation, deterrence, and strategic recalibration
From Tehran’s top levels came immediate, unequivocal condemnation: President Rouhani called the deals “a clear betrayal” of Palestinians and senior officials framed normalization as a strategic mistake; the foreign ministry and IRGC used harsh language calling the pacts “strategic idiocy” and “historic idiocy,” and Iran warned the UAE it would be treated differently if its security was breached [1] [2]. Analysts and regional observers saw the Accords as accelerating an anti‑Iran alignment—ironically pushing Tehran to deepen ties with other actors, recalibrate military postures (including more visible Iranian deterrence in the Gulf), and rally proxies who view normalization as a provocation [8] [9].
2. Palestinian leadership: political rejection, diplomatic protest, and mixed public views
Palestinian officialdom rejected the Accords as an abandonment of the Arab Peace Initiative; the Palestinian Authority recalled its ambassador from Abu Dhabi and refused some Emirati aid offers, framing the pacts as a circumvention of Palestinian rights [3]. Yet on the street and in polls the reaction was not monolithic: surveys showed notable pockets of positive sentiment—47% in Gaza and 63% in East Jerusalem viewed the Accords’ regional impact positively—while large majorities nonetheless felt Arab governments were neglecting Palestinians [4]. Commentators recorded that Palestinian leaders’ denunciations left them politically isolated with diminished leverage over Arab capitals that were now dealing with Israel directly [5] [10].
3. Accords signatories and willing partners: pragmatic normalization and gains
Governments that signed—UAE, Bahrain, Morocco (and Sudan on the declaration)—framed the Accords as opportunities for trade, technology, security cooperation and a new regional architecture that could compete with Iran’s influence; they moved quickly to build economic and security links with Israel [11] [12]. Western and U.S. backers promoted the Accords as a strategic realignment that bolstered regional ties; commentators and think tanks have credited the agreements with opening avenues for defense cooperation and commercial exchange while noting mixed implementation on Palestinian issues [13] [14].
4. The wider Arab world: conditional engagement, domestic politics, and Saudi as the linchpin
Reactions across Arab states were divided. Some governments signaled support or tacit coordination without formal normalization; others publicly resisted, insisting any normalization must be tied to a credible Palestinian peace process—above all Saudi Arabia, which remained the pivotal conditional player whose decision would reshape the Accords’ scope [6] [7]. Public opinion in several Arab countries remained hostile to normalization absent progress on Palestinian statehood, pressuring leaders and complicating expansion plans [15] [16].
5. Longer-term dynamics and competing narratives
Scholars and policy centers debate whether the Accords hardened regional blocs against Iran or created space for pragmatic de‑escalation and economic integration. Some warn the deals deepened divisions and provoked violent responses or emboldened Israeli policies that alienated Palestinians; others argue the Accords institutionalized cooperation that could constrain Tehran and offer a new platform to press for Palestinian‑Israeli progress—but both schools note the Palestinian question remains the key political obstacle to broader Arab buy‑in [17] [18] [19].
6. Limits of available reporting and open questions
Available sources document official Iranian hostility, Palestinian leadership protests, and pragmatic moves by Accords states, but they do not provide a unified metric of causal links between the Accords and specific escalations (e.g., proxy attacks) or a complete, contemporaneous mapping of shifting public opinion across every Arab country; those granular causal claims are not found in current reporting here [9] [6]. Researchers disagree on whether the Accords will ultimately isolate Iran strategically or entrench a new regional balance that leaves the Palestinian issue unresolved [8] [13].
Conclusion: The immediate post‑2020 reaction was clear—Tehran condemned and threatened, Palestinian leaders protested and took diplomatic steps, and Accords signatories pursued pragmatic normalization—yet the politics that determine whether the Accords transform the region hinge on Saudi choices, public sentiment over Palestine, and whether the new ties deliver tangible security and economic dividends without sidelining Palestinian statehood [2] [7] [13].