Fact check: What is the process for removing a congressman from office after an arrest?

1. What the Constitution and chamber rules actually empower lawmakers to do — and what they don’t

The Constitution gives each chamber of Congress the power to expel a member with a two-thirds vote, a political remedy under the chamber’s privileges rather than a criminal sentence; this means the House or Senate can remove a colleague irrespective of a criminal conviction, but only by meeting that supermajority requirement. The provided analyses discuss impeachment and removal in the federal context — impeachment by the House followed by Senate conviction requires a two-thirds vote to remove from office, though impeachment traditionally targets executive and judicial officers, and expulsion is the primary internal tool for legislators ^{[1] [2]}. Expulsion remains a political, not judicial, process.

2. Arrests trigger criminal proceedings but do not automatically remove a member

An arrest launches the ordinary criminal justice process — charging, arraignment, possible plea or trial, and conviction — and criminal conviction may inform or motivate legislative action but does not itself operate as automatic removal unless a conviction triggers statutory or constitutional disqualification. The materials provided emphasize that arrest alone has historically not been sufficient to vacate a seat; instead, legislatures weigh political and ethical considerations before using their disciplinary powers ^{[4] [1]}. Members can remain in office while litigating charges unless their chamber votes otherwise.

3. Expulsion is rare, politically consequential, and high-threshold

Expulsion of a legislator is historically uncommon and treated as a severe measure; before recent high-profile cases there were only a handful of expulsions, underscoring that legislatures reserve expulsion for exceptional conduct. The Tennessee examples cited show a two-thirds threshold in a state chamber and illustrate how political dynamics — party control, public pressure and media attention — shape outcomes as much as facts of alleged criminality ^[2]. The rarity of expulsion signals both its gravity and the political difficulty of assembling the required supermajority.

4. Constitutional disqualification under Section Three offers a separate path in extreme cases

Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a self-executing disqualification for persons who engaged in insurrection or rebellion, and can bar individuals from holding office without the chamber’s expulsion vote; this is distinct from expulsion and impeachment, and relies on a factual determination about participation in insurrection. The analysis notes Section Three’s immediate disqualifying effect where applicable, but its invocation raises complex legal questions and often requires judicial or Congressional clarification about who qualifies ^[3]. This route is narrow and fact-specific compared with the broader political remedy of expulsion.

5. State legislative expulsions can provide precedent but are not federal law

State-level expulsions, like the Tennessee House removals discussed, require the state chamber’s supermajority and reflect state rules and political dynamics rather than federal constitutional procedures. The Tennessee case illustrates how decorum violations and political protest became the proximate causes for expulsion in that state legislature, showing how state bodies apply their disciplinary authority; however, state practice does not change the U.S. House or Senate’s constitutional thresholds for federal members ^[2]. These episodes are instructive about political incentives but not dispositive for federal removal mechanisms.

6. Procedural authorities and deliberative norms shape what legislatures can do

Deliberative bodies possess inherent rights to govern member behavior and punish transgressions under rules such as those described in parliamentary manuals; these authorities let a body require testimony, enforce sanctions, and, at the extreme, expel members, but they are exercised within the chamber’s own rulebook and political context. Robert’s Rules and similar guides articulate institutional rationales for such powers, emphasizing preservation of order and legitimacy; the application of those powers to an arrested member depends on internal investigations, committee referrals and the willingness of colleagues to act ^{[5] [1]}.

7. How constituents, courts and political actors factor into removal outcomes

Removal outcomes reflect an interplay of criminal law, chamber rules, constitutional provisions and politics: constituents can pressure members and recall mechanisms (where available), courts can adjudicate constitutional disqualification claims, and fellow legislators must vote to expel or otherwise discipline, meaning an arrest is one of multiple inputs into a broader decision. The historical and recent examples show that public opinion, media scrutiny and partisan calculation often determine whether legislative action follows an arrest, while legal processes proceed on their own track ^{[4] [2]}.

8. Practical takeaway: arrest is a trigger, not an automatic termination

In sum, an arrest initiates criminal proceedings and can precipitate political consequences, but removal from congressional office requires separate action — expulsion by a two-thirds vote of the chamber, a disqualifying constitutional determination, or, for certain offices, conviction followed by statutory consequences. The supplied materials underscore the rarity and political character of expulsion, the distinctness of impeachment, and the narrow reach of Section Three, so anyone tracking a particular case should follow parallel legal filings, chamber inquiries and votes rather than assuming an arrest equals automatic removal ^{[1] [3] [4]}.