Fact check: RIGHT VIOLENCE

1. What claim are people making — and why it matters for public safety

The central claim is that “right violence” (right-wing extremist attacks) has been more frequent and deadlier than left-wing attacks in the United States since 2001. Multiple academic and government-embedded reviews report that a large share—commonly cited around 75–80 percent—of domestic terrorism fatalities are attributable to right-wing actors, and aggregate event counts show far more ideologically motivated fatalities from far-right groups than from far-left groups ^{[1] [4]}. This matters because resource allocation, law enforcement priorities, and prevention programs depend on accurate assessments of which threats produce the most harm, not simply which receive the loudest political attention.

2. Can we rely on headline percentages? The data story underneath

The cited percentages emerge from compiled incident databases and qualitative coding of incidents by motive, target, and perpetrator ideology. Studies led by academic researchers show right-wing actors are statistically more likely to commit fatal attacks than left-wing actors, and some work finds Islamist attacks have even higher lethality per incident ^[3]. However, fatality-based metrics weight single mass-casualty events heavily. That approach reveals the human toll sharply but can obscure trends in non-lethal plotting, arrests, and network activity. Analysts therefore warn against treating any single metric as definitive without cross-referencing multiple indicators ^{[1] [3]}.

3. The 2025 wrinkle: fewer right-wing attacks but rising left-wing incidents in early 2025

A mid‑2025 review from a major think tank reported a decline in right-wing attacks during 2025 alongside an uptick in left-wing plots, noting five left-wing attacks and plots in the first half of the year that could make 2025 unusually violent for the left if sustained ^[2]. This short-term shift does not overturn the long-term fatality balance, but it does illustrate how annual snapshots can vary and why analysts emphasize both multi-year baselines and near-term surveillance. Policymakers should treat 2025 as a cautionary reminder that ideological balances can change quickly and require adaptable responses ^[2].

4. Government reports, removed studies, and the politics of interpretation

A removed Department of Justice analysis previously posted public figures indicating far-right extremists were responsible for substantially more lethal events than far-left actors—227 events causing over 520 deaths versus 42 events and 78 deaths for far-left actors—before its removal raised political debate about framing and transparency ^[4]. Simultaneously, Department of Homeland Security work focuses on assessment tools and diversion programs to reduce violent extremism, suggesting institutional attention is moving toward prevention and risk assessment even as publication choices spark concern about agendas ^{[5] [4]}. These actions reflect both operational priorities and political scrutiny of official narratives.

5. Prevention and community-level responses showing promise

Recent DHS reviews and allied-program surveys highlight community engagement, deradicalization, and diversion programs as promising practices that can reduce recruitment and interrupt pathways to violence ^[6]. Complementary community guides emphasize local organizing and inclusive interventions to counter hate and lower risk of incident escalation ^[7]. These materials recommend multi-agency, evidence-driven approaches rather than purely punitive responses, reflecting a public-safety orientation that aims to reduce both immediate threats and underlying drivers of radicalization across the ideological spectrum ^{[5] [7] [6]}.

6. Limits of the evidence: coding, definitions, and reporting biases

All available analyses rely on imperfect coding of motive, inconsistent public reporting, and evolving definitions of “domestic terrorism,” which introduce measurement error and potential partisan framing. Researchers explicitly warn that databases differ on inclusion criteria, the weight given to single high‑fatality events, and treatment of mixed‑motive crimes; government removals and selective publication further complicate transparency ^{[1] [4]}. Consequently, any claim that one side is “the primary” perpetrator must be read through the lens of methodological choices and the data’s temporal scope, not as an absolute truth detached from those constraints.

7. Bottom line for readers and policymakers trying to act on the facts

The empirical record through these sources shows a consistent long-term pattern of higher fatalities from right-wing extremist violence, while short-term 2025 data indicate a relative decline in right-wing attacks and an uptick in left-wing plots early in the year ^{[1] [2] [4]}. Given measurement limitations and political contention over presentation, the prudent response is evidence-driven: sustain resources where fatalities and capacity indicate greatest harm, expand prevention and community-based diversion programs highlighted by DHS, and demand transparent, standardized reporting to clarify trends going forward ^{[3] [5] [6]}.