How does right-wing violence compare to left-wing violence in the US since 2020?

1. Why past counts favored the far right — the lethality story that defined 2015–2023

Analysts and federal assessments have repeatedly found the far right to be the most lethal and persistent domestic terrorist threat in recent decades, a pattern reflected in incident and fatality counts through the early 2020s and cited as context for comparisons since 2020. These sources note high-profile mass killings and lethal plots tied to white supremacist, anti‑government, or nativist ideologies as drivers of higher fatalities attributed to right‑wing actors, and summary statistics frequently show right‑wing perpetrators account for a majority share of politically motivated homicides analyzed in the period leading up to 2024 ^{[1] [3]}. This framing shaped policymaker and media emphasis on right‑wing counterterrorism resources.

2. The 2024–2025 signal: rising left‑wing incidents or a data blip?

A 2024–2025 cluster of reports and a CSIS review suggest an increase in left‑wing attacks and a relative decline in right‑wing incidents, with at least one 2025 account indicating left‑wing attacks outnumbered far‑right attacks that year, though still producing fewer fatalities per incident ^{[2] [3]}. Analysts caution that the absolute numbers are small and that methodological differences — including how “left‑wing” is defined, whether property destruction counts, and the time windows used — materially affect conclusions. Several commentators warn that short‑term shifts can reflect reactive cycles, law‑enforcement focus, or definitional changes rather than durable trends ^[3].

3. Different measures, different stories: incidents versus lethality and methodology matters

Comparisons depend on whether one counts incidents, arrests, plots, property damage, or deaths. Some datasets emphasize fatalities and thus make the right‑wing share appear larger; others counting a broader set of politically motivated acts find more parity or even rises in left‑wing activity. The NPR and CSIS discussions highlight that small sample sizes amplify measurement error and that researchers diverge on inclusion criteria, producing conflicting headlines despite overlapping underlying events ^{[3] [4]}. This methodological variance explains why some outlets state the far right remains the most lethal, while others headline a left‑wing uptick.

4. Where analysts agree and where they argue — consensus and contested points

There is broad agreement that politically motivated violence in the U.S. remains relatively rare in absolute terms and that both right‑ and left‑wing violence can and do pose threats, but experts contest which side is the greater current hazard. Cato’s assessment emphasizes rarity and shows right‑wing actors were responsible for a plurality of politically motivated murders in a given analysis, whereas CSIS and other analysts document recent partisan plots and a shifting mix of motivations for attacks against government targets ^{[5] [4]}. The contested points revolve around trend durability, statistical significance, and policy implications for counterterrorism resourcing ^{[6] [2]}.

5. What to watch next — evidence gaps, policy implications, and framing risks

Future clarity depends on standardized definitions, transparent methodology, and multi‑year observation: short‑term fluctuations can mislead. Analysts urge caution in reallocating counterterrorism resources solely on single‑year shifts because low counts make percentage changes volatile; instead, they call for sustained data collection, cross‑agency sharing, and attention to both lethality and breadth of activity ^{[3] [1]}. Readers should also note potential agendas: think tanks and advocacy groups may emphasize either rarity to argue against expanded surveillance or rising threats to press for more resources, so comparing methodological notes and publication dates (2024–2025 emphasis in these analyses) is essential for an accurate picture ^{[5] [7]}.