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What recent dismissals or arrests of Kremlin officials occurred in Russia in 2025?
Executive summary
Reporting from 2025 shows several high-profile dismissals and resignations among Kremlin officials and a steady stream of arrests of regional or other officials tied to corruption or security cases. Notable Kremlin departures reported include the dismissal of Russia’s space agency head after a failed moon mission (reported as a Kremlin dismissal) [1] and the resignation of long-time Kremlin aide Dmitry Kozak, who reportedly opposed the Ukraine war [2]; separate accounts document dozens of regional officials arrested on corruption or treason-related charges through 2025 [3] [4].
1. Kremlin sacks space chief after failed moonshot — public “rotation” framed as dismissal
Reuters reported that the Kremlin dismissed the head of Russia’s space agency in February 2025 following the high-profile failure of Russia’s first moon mission in decades; Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the change as a “rotation,” but the news was framed in reporting as a dismissal tied to program failure [1].
2. Longtime insider Dmitry Kozak quits — framed as voluntary but politically significant
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFERL) covered the September 2025 resignation of Dmitry Kozak, a deputy head of the Presidential Administration and a decades-long Putin confidant, noting his departure was “opted to leave on his accord” even as other reporting emphasized the rarity and political significance of such exits in a system that prizes loyalty; Kozak was reported to have opposed the war in Ukraine, which commentators treated as context for the move [2].
3. Rumours about Sergey Lavrov’s standing — absence fuels speculation, Kremlin denies ouster
Multiple outlets noted that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s absence from key meetings and his omission from a G20 delegation in late 2025 fueled speculation he’d fallen from favour; the Kremlin and allies publicly denied reports of an ouster, calling rumours “absolutely untrue” while outlets such as The Guardian and Politico highlighted the swirl of reporting and denials [5] [6].
4. A wave of regional arrests on corruption and security grounds
Independent reporting documented a wider pattern of arrests across regions in 2025: The Moscow Times reported dozens of regional officials arrested on corruption suspicions (noting specific cases tied to fortification construction near the Ukrainian border), and other outlets described treason or security-related detentions in the Far East and Moscow for alleged contacts with foreign services or sharing military data [3] [4] [7].
5. Security services’ growing role and “carousel” arrests — institutional context for detentions
Analysis pieces and rights reporting describe a broader environment in which security agencies have expanded their remit and now operate with fewer political guardrails; Carnegie and The Moscow Times described rising use of administrative and serial detentions (“carousel arrests”) and argued the security apparatus increasingly uses arrests both to enforce discipline and to create deterrence, suggesting many detentions reflect political control as much as criminal justice [8] [9] [10].
6. Arrests beyond officials — treason, terrorism and politically charged cases
Beyond officialdom, 2025 reporting highlighted arrest cases with political or national-security overtones: the FSB detained people accused of treason for alleged contact with NATO or sharing military information; journalists, activists and scientists faced charges framed as treason or extremism; these stories illustrate the broad application of severe statutes in politically sensitive cases [7] [4] [11] [12].
7. What these personnel moves and arrests signal — interpretations diverge
Analysts cited in the coverage offer two competing readings: some see dismissals and resignations as routine “rotations” or voluntary exits managed by the Kremlin (the space chief and Peskov’s wording on rotation) [1]; others and many independent analysts interpret Kozak’s departure and the spike in arrests as evidence of internal purges, securitization of governance, and punishment of dissent or corruption that threatens wartime priorities [2] [9]. The sources disagree on whether some exits (e.g., Lavrov’s reported sidelining) are genuine falls from grace or tactical public messaging; official denials coexist with persistent media suspicion [5] [6].
8. Limitations and gaps in available reporting
Available sources do not provide a comprehensive list of every Kremlin official dismissed or arrested in 2025; much reporting focuses on emblematic cases, regional arrest patterns, and analysis. Specifics about internal Kremlin deliberations, full legal charges in many arrests, and confirmation of motivations behind some resignations (for example, whether Kozak left solely for political reasons) are often absent or contested in the public record [2] [3] [9].
In sum, 2025 coverage shows a mix of Kremlin personnel changes framed officially as rotations or resignations and a clear uptick in arrests linked to corruption or national-security allegations; analysts see this as part of a broader securitization of Russian governance, while the Kremlin often disputes narratives of internal discord [1] [2] [3] [9].