Russia's Claim to Historic Waters

Checked on January 23, 2026
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Executive summary

Russia has been steadily reworking the legal and practical contours of what it calls its “historic” or internal waters—from the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route to the Sea of Azov and parts of the Baltic—deploying domestic laws, baseline redrawings and decrees that would limit foreign navigation and strengthen state control [1] [2] [3]. Those measures collide with longstanding principles of international law—particularly UNCLOS rules on baselines, territorial sea and transit passage—and with the objections of neighbours and the United States, leaving disputes more political than conclusively legal at present [1] [4] [5].

1. The Northern Sea Route: Russia’s “national transport artery” and the claim to historic control

Moscow now treats the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a single, historically emerged national transport route and has layered domestic laws requiring prior authorization for navigation and special rules for foreign warships, effectively treating large swathes as subject to Russian control beyond classical territorial limits [1] [2]. Western critics argue these rules are incompatible with the doctrine of innocent or transit passage for straits used for international navigation, a point the United States has repeatedly made in notes disputing Russian control over key Arctic straits [4] [1]. Russia’s posture mirrors Canada’s disputed claim to the Northwest Passage—illustrating that Arctic litigation often reflects competing interpretations rather than settled law [1].

2. Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait: historic bay, condominium or unilateral annexation?

Soviet-era maneuvers drawing straight baselines across the Kerch Strait and treating the Sea of Azov as internal waters underpin Russia’s contemporary position that those waters are effectively domestic or jointly controlled, a status Moscow has reiterated in bilateral statements and post-Soviet agreements with Ukraine [6]. Legal scholars note the Sea of Azov’s designation has elements of “historic bay” and inherited condominium doctrine, but also emphasize ambiguity about whether such labels were meant as legal acts or political-geographic descriptions—ambiguity Russia exploits [6]. Recent Russian announcements that the Sea of Azov will be named Russian internal waters have alarmed observers and are contentious given Ukraine’s co-claims and the post-2014 control dynamics [5] [6].

3. Baltic baseline redrawings: technical update or strategic encroachment?

Proposals and decrees to update Soviet-era baseline coordinates in the Gulf of Finland and around Kaliningrad would convert waters between coastlines and islands into internal waters under Russian law, effectively narrowing routes available for foreign vessels without permission and provoking sharp reactions from Finland, the Baltic states and NATO members [3] [7]. Moscow frames these moves as technical modernizations of outdated charts, but neighbouring capitals and analysts see them as politically freighted attempts to expand Russian leverage over communications, energy and security in a high-stakes maritime theatre [8] [3].

4. International law, precedent and limits of Russia’s “historic title” arguments

Russia’s historic-water claims rest on a mix of Soviet-era baseline declarations, domestic maritime strategy and selective invocation of concepts like historic bays or internal waters, but those constructs must square with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and state practice—areas where Russia’s positions are disputed and, in some cases, inconsistent over decades [5] [1]. Critics point out that other states, including Canada, have made comparable claims, so the problem is less unique to Russia than symptomatic of gaps and contestation in maritime law, but unilateral assertions risk diplomatic friction and may be litigated or challenged by freedom-of-navigation operations [1] [4].

5. Motives, rhetoric and geopolitical effects: resources, passages and power projection

Behind the legal texts lies a clear strategic logic: control of the NSR and nearby baselines preserves access to Arctic resources, shortcuts for trade and military maneuverability, and gives Moscow bargaining chips with China and NATO—making the maritime claims as much about geopolitics and resource extraction as about abstract historic rights [9] [2]. Observers warn that portraying these steps as mere cartographic housekeeping masks an intent to harden maritime sovereignty in ways that complicate neighborly commerce and Western naval presence, while Russia counters that rival claims by Arctic neighbours justify its posture [9] [1].

6. Outlook: contested waters, unresolved law and likely flashpoints

Absent a negotiated settlement or binding international adjudication, the trajectory is continued contestation: more domestic laws and decrees from Moscow, protest notes and possible freedom-of-navigation operations from Western states, and heightened regional tension around chokepoints like the Kerch Strait, Arctic straits and parts of the Baltic—disputes rooted as much in power politics as in a coherent, legally adjudicated “historic waters” doctrine [1] [3] [6]. Public sources do not show a definitive legal victory for Russia; they show incremental consolidation of control backed by force and statute, and an international order struggling to absorb competing interpretations of maritime sovereignty [2] [5].

Want to dive deeper?
How have freedom-of-navigation operations challenged Russian claims in the Northern Sea Route?
What legal precedents exist for 'historic bay' or 'historic waters' rulings at the International Court of Justice or ITLOS?
How would a Russian withdrawal from UNCLOS affect disputes over the Arctic and Baltic baselines?