Are we more or less safe with the removal of Maduro from power?
Executive summary
The removal of Nicolás Maduro reduces one immediate threat vector — the continuation of an authoritarian regime long accused of corruption and facilitating illicit networks — but it simultaneously increases short- and medium-term risks to U.S. and regional security because the institutional drivers of violence and transnational trafficking remain in place and could react violently to external intervention [1] [2]. In short: in the short term the region is less safe; in the longer term safety gains are possible but far from guaranteed and hinge on messy political, military and economic choices [3] [4].
1. The immediate security shock: power vacuums, armed groups and retaliation
The U.S. operation that captured Maduro decapitated Venezuela’s top leadership but left the coercive institutions and networks—military hierarchies, colectivos and transnational armed groups—largely intact, creating a high risk of violent fragmentation and revenge attacks, notably from the ELN, which controls much of the Colombia–Venezuela border and has already signalled willingness to retaliate [5] [6] [7]. Analysts and regional officials warned that the removal could provoke chaos along borders, spur retaliatory strikes against Western targets, and prompt the ELN and other armed actors to exploit a security vacuum [6] [7].
2. Refugees, border strain and regional instability
The sudden change has already prompted population movements and alarm among neighbours: Colombia mobilised forces and prepared for refugee flows, and humanitarian groups caution that instability will fall unevenly on neighbouring states that already host Venezuelan migrants [8] [6] [2]. The prospect that oil revenues will remain blocked while production collapses could further degrade government capacity to provide services, amplifying displacement and criminal competition over scarce resources [1].
3. Transnational crime and drug-trafficking dynamics
If the state’s chains of command fray, cocaine and other illicit flows that relied on arrangements with the Maduro-era apparatus could reconfigure into more violent and opaque networks; some observers say the intervention threatens criminal supply chains and could provoke violence as groups scramble to protect routes and profits [6] [1]. Conversely, proponents argue that removing a central patron for trafficking could eventually degrade those networks, but most experts caution this is neither quick nor certain and historically foreign-imposed regime change rarely yields prompt disruption of illicit economies [4] [3].
4. The geopolitical ripple: Moscow, Beijing, Havana and international law costs
The operation has provoked international condemnation and increased tensions with states that backed Maduro; Russia, China and Cuba criticised the incursion and Cuba declared mourning for military losses, raising the prospect of proxy tensions and diplomatic fallout that could complicate U.S. security priorities elsewhere [9] [8] [10]. Critics also warn the legal and normative precedent of an extra‑regional forcible removal undermines international law and may encourage countermeasures that reduce global predictability—an important dimension of strategic risk [10] [4].
5. Economic levers, sanctions and the unfinished transition
Even after Maduro’s removal, core U.S. sanctions remain in force and Washington has signalled strict conditions for any normalisation — including severing ties with China, Russia, Iran and Cuba — meaning economic stabilisation and reconstruction are constrained unless policy shifts, and companies must still comply with OFAC restrictions [11] [1]. That choke on oil revenue risks denying Venezuelans the material benefits of any political change and could deepen instability unless the U.S. couples coercion with credible, inclusive economic plans [11] [1].
6. Long-term upside is conditional, not automatic
A potential long-term security benefit is a reduced safe haven for illicit state-linked activity and a geopolitical signal of deterrence to adversaries, which some analysts see as a broader strategic win [3]. However, scholars and practitioners interviewed by think tanks warn democratization by force is costly and often fails without sustained international engagement, credible local partners and rebuilding of institutions—conditions that are currently uncertain [4] [5].
Conclusion: safer only if the messy middle is managed
Removal of Maduro lowers one structural danger but raises several immediate threats—violence, refugees, criminal realignments and geopolitical backlash—making the region less safe in the near term [6] [7] [1]. Any net increase in safety for the United States and its neighbours will depend on rapid, coordinated diplomacy, clear post‑operation rules of the road on sanctions and oil, and concrete plans to neutralise and reintegrate armed actors; absent those, safety will likely be worse, not better [11] [2] [5].