Sanctions against Russia are not working.

1. Sanctions have hurt Russia’s economy—but not shattered it

Multiple analyses find that Western measures produced substantial macroeconomic effects: IMF and independent trackers put Russian GDP roughly 10–12 percent below pre-invasion trends three years in, and oil revenues fell sharply after export-targeted restrictions—evidence the coalition sanctions have real cost (Economics Observatory; Consilium; CSIS) ^{[2] [3] [1]}. The German Marshall Fund and CSIS highlight collapsing sovereign buffers and a reorientation toward a wartime economy, stressing that the Russian economy of 2026 is structurally different—and weaker—than in 2021 ^{[7] [1]}.

2. Evasion and “shadow” networks blunt impact

Russia’s response has been to rewire trade: a shadow tanker fleet, ship-to-ship transfers and opaque ownership structures have helped sustain exports to Asia, while increased commerce with Turkey, India and China has softened the bite of Western trade restrictions, according to CEPR and industry reporting ^{[4] [8]}. Reuters and Brookings document that additional sanctions against tankers and tighter enforcement can depress these flows, but that pattern underlines a growing cat-and-mouse problem: sanctions work only as long as enforcement outpaces evasion ^{[5] [9]}.

3. Enforcement is inconsistent across the coalition

The effectiveness of sanctions depends on coordinated enforcement, and critics note gaps: the U.S. has greater leverage when it acts decisively, but hundreds of vessels sanctioned by the EU/U.K. were not targeted by the U.S., limiting pressure on Russia’s maritime routes; analysts call for fuller transatlantic alignment to close loopholes (Brookings; p1_s8). The Holland & Knight briefing and Reuters coverage show that divergent national policies and commercial incentives create openings that Moscow exploits ^{[10] [5]}.

4. Political aims remain ambiguous and measurable outcomes are scarce

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that agencies implementing sanctions lacked clear, measurable targets tied to policy objectives—meaning Washington cannot fully assess whether sanctions are meeting their political goals ^[6]. That matters because some proponents (e.g., CFR, GMF) argue sanctions are as much about signaling norms and deterrence as about coercing capitulation—an argument that reframes “success” away from forcing immediate political change ^{[11] [7]}.

5. Moscow’s narrative and propaganda complicate public perception

Russian officials tout resilience and portray sanctions as failures—claims amplified by state-aligned outlets and echoed selectively in foreign outlets—yet independent trackers contradict absolute claims of success or failure. For example, Anadolu and Tass-style citations of “development despite sanctions” must be weighed against independent data showing GDP slippage and reserve depletion ^{[12] [7]}. Recognizing these competing narratives is essential to avoid mistaking PR for policy reality ^[13].

6. Bottom line: partial success, persistent limits, policy implications

Sanctions are neither wholly ineffective nor a silver bullet: they have inflicted damage, reshaped Russian economic choices, and raised the costs of war, but evasion, trade diversion, uneven enforcement and unclear political metrics limit their capacity to compel a change in Kremlin behavior on their own (CSIS; CEPR; GAO) ^{[1] [4] [6]}. The logical policy response—advocated by analysts at Brookings, CSIS and others—is sustained, better-coordinated sanctions, tighter targeting of enablers (banks, insurers, tankers) and complementary measures (diplomacy, military assistance to Ukraine) rather than the expectation that sanctions alone will end the war ^{[9] [1]}.