How has Section 4 of the 25th Amendment been discussed or considered in past presidential crises?
Executive summary
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment — the constitutional mechanism that allows the vice president and a majority of the Cabinet (or a congressionally created body) to declare the president unable to discharge the duties of office — has been discussed intensively during several crises but has never been invoked in American history [1] [2]. Discussions have mixed legal analysis, historical precedent, and raw politics: advisers and lawmakers have eyed Section 4 in moments of presidential incapacitation or alleged unfitness, yet institutional and political barriers have repeatedly kept it off the table [3] [4].
1. Reagan’s near-miss: the surgical scare that clarified limits
After the March 30, 1981 assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan, the White House and some observers later concluded Section 4 could have been relevant, but it was not invoked — Reagan was incapacitated briefly and power transfer questions surfaced, yet Vice President George H. W. Bush did not assume acting authority because Reagan was out of surgery by the time Bush returned to Washington and Section 3 (voluntary transfer) rather than Section 4 framed subsequent discussion [5] [2] [6].
2. The Trump era: political crisis turned constitutional fever
The January 6, 2021 Capitol attack reignited high-profile calls to use Section 4, with members of Congress, the White House staff, and commentators publicly debating whether Vice President Mike Pence and Cabinet secretaries should declare President Trump unfit; Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other leaders reportedly considered the amendment as an alternative or supplement to impeachment, but Section 4 was never activated [5] [6] [7].
3. Legal and institutional friction: why lawyers and scholars warn of limits
Legal scholars and the Congressional Research Service stress that Section 4 places the vice president at the center of any declaration and requires a majority of the president’s Cabinet or another body that Congress could establish, producing both procedural complexity and political peril; the Supreme Court has not definitively interpreted the amendment, leaving unresolved questions about the precise scope and consequences of invoking Section 4 [8] [3] [4].
4. Politics, deterrents, and the “horror stories” problem
Congressional reports and commentators have long warned that Section 4 was designed to address genuine incapacity, not to depose an unpopular leader, and that safeguards (the Cabinet threshold, presidential ability to contest, and a congressional vote to resolve disputes) intentionally raise the bar to prevent partisan misuse — a dynamic that nonetheless discourages actors from using the mechanism except in the clearest medical cases [8] [4] [9].
5. Alternative methods and the practical void
Because Section 4 has never been used, administrations and Congresses have relied on ad hoc measures (Section 3 for voluntary transfers around medical procedures) and political remedies like impeachment to address alleged unfitness; historians note repeated public campaigns and staff discussions over decades urging Section 4’s use, yet the amendment’s procedural uncertainties and political risks left it largely a rhetorical tool rather than a practiced remedy [6] [9] [3].
6. Lessons from debate: reform, review bodies, and unanswered legal questions
Post‑crisis analysis has generated repeated proposals to codify a Disability Review Body (DRB) or clarify Congress’s power to designate an alternative body to consult with the vice president — proposals that would require legislation and could be vetoed, and whose adoption is constrained by political incentives of sitting presidents — while major gaps in judicial interpretation mean crucial questions about timing, standards, and remedies remain unsettled [8] [4] [3].
7. The political anatomy of invocation: incentives and reputational cost
Across episodes from Reagan to Trump, the central lesson is political: the vice president’s indispensable role combined with the Cabinet’s required participation creates a collective-action problem where reputational, partisan, and career costs deter officials from pressing Section 4 except where incapacity is undeniable; critics argue that the amendment’s high thresholds intentionally avoid easy removal, while advocates counter that the reluctance underlines the need for clearer statutory procedures or norms [9] [7] [10].