How did the Secure Communities program operate and why was it controversial?
Executive summary
Secure Communities (S‑Comm) was a DHS/ICE biometric information‑sharing program that automatically routed arrestees’ fingerprints taken at local jails through the FBI to Homeland Security databases so ICE could identify removable noncitizens and often lodge detainers for transfer to federal custody [1] [2]. Its aggressive expansion, frequent use to target low‑level arrestees, and perceived undermining of local policing and civil liberties made it politically and legally controversial, prompting DHS reviews, local resistance, a temporary suspension and eventual replacement efforts [3] [4] [5].
1. How the program actually operated: a technological bridge between jails and ICE
Under Secure Communities the routine biometric workflow used by local law enforcement—fingerprints sent to the FBI after arrest for criminal checks—was configured to automatically pass those prints on to DHS/ICE for immigration status matches, allowing ICE to identify immigrants in custody without deputizing local officers to enforce immigration law [1] [2].
2. What ICE did with matches: detainers, priorities, and the promised focus on serious offenders
When ICE matches showed an immigration record, the agency could issue an administrative detainer (requesting that the local jail hold the person for ICE) and prioritize transfers based on its own risk categories intended to target serious public‑safety threats, though ICE’s stated prioritization did not prevent detainers for many with minor or no convictions [1] [3] [5].
3. Scale and timeline: rapid rollout and national reach by 2013
Piloted in 2008, S‑Comm was expanded rapidly—reaching well over a thousand jurisdictions under the Obama administration and ultimately implemented in all U.S. jurisdictions by January 22, 2013, according to ICE accounts [3] [1] [6].
4. Concrete criticisms: wrongful matches, low‑level arrests, and family disruption
Critics documented systematic problems: database flaws yielded false matches—including U.S. citizens misidentified as noncitizens—large numbers of transfers and deportations of people with minor or no convictions, and resulting family separations, with organizations such as the ACLU and public‑health advocates arguing Secure Communities ensnared noncriminals and low‑level offenders in a federal immigration dragnet [3] [7] [8] [6].
5. Community policing and racial‑profiling concerns that fueled local backlash
Public‑safety and civil‑rights groups, as well as the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Task Force, warned S‑Comm harmed community policing by deterring victims and witnesses from interacting with police and created incentives for racial profiling, prompting hundreds of counties and many elected officials to refuse or formally protest participation [9] [8] [10] [7].
6. Transparency, governance, and legal critiques: administrative creation without rulemaking
Observers noted that Secure Communities was created administratively rather than by statute, was implemented without formal regulatory rulemaking governing its operation, and generated calls for reform or suspension from a DHS Task Force that concluded the program was “fundamentally flawed” and in need of change [3] [11] [4].
7. Government response: suspension, replacement, and contested “reforms”
Faced with legal and political pressure, DHS temporarily suspended S‑Comm operational posture in 2014 and later launched the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) intended to narrow detainers to higher‑priority individuals; ICE defended S‑Comm as a common‑sense way to enforce priorities but critics said administrative tweaks and civil‑rights monitoring did not address core incentives or the program’s fundamental reach [1] [5] [12].
8. Competing narratives and implicit agendas
Supporters framed S‑Comm as a technology‑driven, non‑deputizing tool to remove dangerous criminals [1], while opponents emphasized civil‑liberties harms, fiscal costs to counties, and erosion of trust in policing [8] [10]; implicit agendas ranged from DHS’s operational desire to expand removable‑alien identification rapidly without congressional authorizing legislation, to local jurisdictions’ resistance motivated by public‑safety and fiscal concerns [3] [10] [4].