What did the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms testify about requests for National Guard support on Jan. 6?
Executive summary
Former House Sergeant at Arms Paul Irving and former Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger gave testimony that differs from Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund’s account about when formal National Guard requests were made on Jan. 6, 2021, with Irving saying his records show no call at 1:09 p.m. while Sund and several official reports place requests to the sergeants at arms in the early afternoon (including specific times of 12:57–1:22 p.m.) [1] [2] [3]. Senate and committee reports concluded those informal conversations and a lack of coordinated, formal requests contributed to delays in Guard deployment [4].
1. The core disagreement: competing timelines and who was asked when
The central testimony conflict presented to congressional and Senate panels is straightforward: Chief Steven Sund says he asked the House and Senate sergeants at arms for an emergency declaration and Guard help in the early afternoon—citing times ranging from just before 1 p.m. through 1:22 p.m.—while Paul Irving’s written testimony and phone records say he has no record of a Sund call at 1:09 p.m. and that the first one‑o’clock‑hour call he can document is at 1:28 p.m.; reporting also records versions where Irving says he did not recall a Guard request until after 2 p.m., creating a sharp, consequential discrepancy [2] [1] [5] [3].
2. What Paul Irving told investigators and what his records show
Irving submitted written testimony to the Senate that emphasizes his lack of memory of a 1:09 p.m. call from Chief Sund, and he cited phone records to support that claim—those records show no incoming call from Sund at 1:09 and list the first Sund call in the one o’clock hour as 1:28 p.m.; Irving also described prior pre‑Jan. 6 discussions about limited Guard roles but portrayed the operational intelligence as not justifying a larger Guard presence in advance [1].
3. Sund’s account and the Select Committee’s reconstruction
Sund told the Select Committee he reached Irving at roughly 12:57–12:58 p.m. and told him “we are getting overrun on the West Front by thousands. We need the National Guard now,” and the committee’s final report records Sund’s assertion that he sought a state of emergency and Guard troops well before the later approvals—contrasting with Irving’s timeline and underscoring the committee’s finding of conflicting recollections among top security officials [2].
4. The Senate/HSGAC and other official reviews: informal talks, no full coordination
The Senate Homeland Security and Rules report and other oversight documents concluded Chief Sund had informal conversations with Irving and Stenger about possible Guard support but that no coordinated, full discussion occurred with the Architect of the Capitol and other necessary actors, a failure the reports say contributed to the delay in deploying D.C. National Guard forces [4]. Those reviews flagged institutional weakness in the Capitol Police Board decision‑making and uneven cooperation with oversight requests after the fact [4].
5. Michael Stenger’s role and prior pre‑event discussions
Public filings and testimony show Senate Sergeant at Arms Michael Stenger participated in pre‑Jan. 6 planning discussions, including a small Guard offer for unarmed traffic support that was discussed on Jan. 4, and Stenger is named alongside Irving in accounts of informal conversations with Sund on Jan. 6; Stenger resigned in the immediate aftermath of the attack, and his role figures into the broader narrative of fragmented pre‑event planning and contested memories of requests that day [1] [5] [4].
6. Why the testimony matters and the unresolved questions
These conflicting sworn accounts matter because they shape who had authority, who knew what when, and why there was a multi‑hour gap between the peak of violence and the Guard’s arrival; oversight reports and hearings repeatedly point to informal, unrecorded conversations and incomplete cooperation with investigators as drivers of the post‑event confusion, and several officials either provided differing timelines or declined to fully comply with information requests—leaving remaining factual gaps about the precise sequence and approvals [4] [5] [2].