What actions did the U.S. Department of State take regarding Qatar and terrorism designations in 2017?
Executive summary
In 2017 the U.S. State Department did not label Qatar a “state sponsor of terrorism”; instead Washington increased counterterrorism cooperation with Doha, culminating in a Counterterrorism Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 2017 and technical assistance (training and workshops) to help Qatar build domestic designation and financial‑monitoring capacity [1] [2]. U.S. officials publicly acknowledged both progress and remaining gaps in Qatar’s efforts to curb terrorist financing on or before June–July 2017 [3] [4].
1. A diplomatic split, not a U.S. designation
The major regional accusation against Qatar in mid‑2017 came from Saudi Arabia and its partners, not from a formal U.S. State Department “state sponsor” designation. The State Department’s publicly available materials and subsequent country reporting show the United States did not add Qatar to its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism; instead, U.S. reporting and officials described a relationship that combined criticism of inconsistencies with active cooperation [5] [3].
2. From public criticism to pragmatic engagement
Public rhetoric in June 2017 included sharp statements by President Trump accusing Qatar of funding extremism, but those comments diverged from the State Department and Pentagon posture, which sought to preserve military and counter‑ISIL cooperation with Doha. Independent observers note the tweets and presidential statements contrasted with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s more cautious call for moderation, while the State Department itself emphasized progress alongside outstanding problems [4] [3].
3. The July 2017 Counterterrorism Memorandum of Understanding
The most concrete action by the State Department in 2017 was the Counterterrorism Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the U.S. Secretary of State and Qatar’s foreign minister in July 2017. U.S. reporting and the State Department’s country review say the MoU set out mutually accepted measures for information sharing, disrupting terrorism financing, and intensifying counterterrorism activities and led to increased technical assistance [1] [2].
4. Technical assistance, training and capacity building
Following the MoU, U.S. agencies — notably the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury and the FBI — provided workshops and training to Qatari law‑enforcement and judicial officials. Examples cited in U.S. country reporting include a workshop on domestic designation regimes, FBI training on watchlists and terrorism financing investigations, and Justice Department advisors embedded to build prosecution capacity [1].
5. Targeted operational steps and limits of U.S. action
U.S. action focused on capacity‑building and cooperation rather than punitive state labeling. The State Department and allied agencies worked to help Qatar establish domestic mechanisms — for instance, guidance on creating a domestic designations list — and to improve monitoring of charitable activity; these were practical steps rather than sanctions or formal U.S. designations [1] [2]. Sources also note that despite these efforts, U.S. reports continued to say implementation was uneven and that individuals within Qatar still served as sources of finance for extremist networks [4] [6].
6. Where the record shows disagreement and political pressure
Congressional testimony and NGO analysis from 2017–2020 show disagreement over whether U.S. actions sufficiently pressured Qatar. Some lawmakers and analysts pushed for tougher labels or legislative action to review Qatar’s special U.S. status, while the State Department prioritized operational cooperation tied to U.S. military needs and counter‑ISIL objectives [6] [7]. The wider Gulf dispute — the Saudi‑led blockade of Qatar — intensified political pressure but did not change Washington’s core approach as reflected in State Department reports [3] [8].
7. What the sources do not say
Available sources do not mention the U.S. State Department ever formally designating Qatar as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 2017, nor do they document U.S. sanctions against Qatar of the kind tied to that designation [5] [1]. They do not provide an exhaustive list of every bilateral meeting or internal cable; instead they document the MoU, training, and public statements about progress and shortfalls [1] [2].
8. Bottom line — cooperation over designation
In 2017 the State Department’s principal actions regarding Qatar and terrorism were to acknowledge concerns about inconsistent enforcement, to increase counterterrorism cooperation through a formal MoU and capacity‑building activities, and to press Doha to tighten oversight of charities and financial flows — not to declare Qatar a state sponsor of terrorism [1] [3]. The contrast between political rhetoric from some U.S. actors and the State Department’s operational emphasis shaped Washington’s response.