How have state election officials responded to threats of federal interference in recent election cycles?
Executive summary
State election officials have responded to threats of federal interference and broader threats to elections by tightening coordination with local and state partners, rehearsing responses, and adopting new security protocols—but they are also juggling rising turnover, political pressure, and the loss of some federal information‑sharing resources [1] [2] [3] [4]. Responses mix defensive operational work—tabletop exercises, law‑enforcement coordination, physical security upgrades—with legal and political maneuvers at the state level to blunt outside pressure and shore up public confidence [2] [5] [6].
1. Coordinating vertically: more contact with law enforcement and federal agencies
Many state and local election offices increased formal coordination with law enforcement and federal agencies to anticipate and defuse threats, with 94 percent of officials reporting interagency preparation and roughly 80 percent reporting coordination with law enforcement ahead of the 2024 cycle, and federal actors like ODNI, FBI and CISA actively briefing and sharing threat information in that period [1] [7] [8]. These strengthened lines of communication were credited with helping manage real‑world incidents in 2024—such as bomb threats and suspicious packages—by enabling rapid alerts and operational responses across jurisdictions [7] [2].
2. Hardening operations: exercises, training, and physical safeguards
Election administrators deployed practical hardening measures: regular tabletop exercises, incident‑response rehearsals, physical security assessments, and new guidance on handling suspicious mail and hazardous materials, often based on federal guidance even as resources shifted; CISA conducted nearly 1,300 physical security assessments that local officials used to improve facility protections [2] [4] [5]. Some states also required frontline actors—like new police officers in Georgia—to receive election‑law and voter‑protection training, reflecting a turn toward institutionalizing frontline protections against intimidation and interference [2].
3. Legal and political countermeasures: statutes, funding conditions, and pressure management
States have pursued both statutory protections for election workers and administrative tools to push back on outside pressure, with legislatures revising laws and passing stand‑alone protections to curb harassment and clarify officials’ duties after 2020 [6]. At the same time, federal actors have used legal and policy tools—such as the White House’s 2025 directive tying Election Assistance Commission funds to uniform standards—to try to shape state behavior, forcing a mix of cooperation and concern among state officials about federal reach [9]. Election officials themselves report worrying about politically motivated investigations and pressure to certify results for particular candidates, prompting some offices to prepare protocols for resisting improper interference [1].
4. Filling gaps as federal support ebbs: resources, staffing, and information shortfalls
Officials are also coping with reductions in federal support: the termination of funding for mechanisms like the EI‑ISAC and cuts at CISA have left states scrambling to replace lost information‑sharing and some cybersecurity services, prompting officials to seek alternative vendors, state funding, or ad hoc workarounds while warning of increased exposure [4] [10]. Those stresses compound a staffing crisis—survey data show persistent threats, high turnover, and many officials leaving the field—undermining institutional knowledge just as the threat environment grows more complex [3] [11].
5. A mixed record: effective mitigation but lingering vulnerabilities and partisan friction
Where federal‑state coordination held, preparation often kept disruptions from derailing elections—practices that many advocates and agencies hail as progress—but the picture remains uneven: federal agencies in 2024 both stepped up public warnings and enforcement actions and simultaneously reduced or restructured programs that supported local officials, creating a patchwork of capabilities and political debate over appropriate federal involvement [7] [5] [4]. Alternative perspectives exist within the reporting: some officials welcome more aggressive federal action against foreign malign influence, while others fear federal overreach or politicized investigations, leaving state election officials to balance operational security, legal autonomy, and political pressures as they defend elections [7] [1] [12].