Which states used paper ballots in the 2024 election for added security?

Executive Summary — Paper ballots were the dominant security feature in 2024: most states used voting systems that produced a voter‑verifiable paper record, and virtually all key swing states ran elections on paper‑based systems allowing post‑election audits and voter verification. Official summaries and nonprofit trackers converge on the point that roughly 95–98% of votes nationwide were captured on paper or paper‑equivalent records, with only a handful of jurisdictions lacking a paper trail (sources vary on exact percentages) ^{[1] [2] [3]}. This analysis extracts the central claims, contrasts reporting across multiple trackers, and flags where coverage is incomplete or framed with institutional agendas.

1. Why advocates say paper ballots mattered in 2024 — Security and verifiability drew broad consensus

Election‑security organizations and policy centers reported that the 2024 infrastructure leaned heavily on paper records because they enable voter verification and robust post‑election audits, a point reinforced across multiple trackers and explainers ^{[1] [2]}. Sources highlight that all high‑profile swing states used paper‑producing systems or voter‑verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs), enabling tabulation to be cross‑checked against physical ballots — a change that advocates say increases public confidence and auditability ^{[3] [4]}. The Brennan Center data and civic tech trackers emphasize that this was not uniform in method: jurisdictions used hand‑marked paper ballots, ballot‑marking devices that produce ballots, or machines that generate VVPATs, but the common thread was a paper record that audits could access ^{[4] [5]}.

2. Which states (and places) specifically used paper methods — A widespread, if varied, picture

State‑by‑state equipment trackers and nonprofit databases list Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Wisconsin and many others as using systems that produce paper ballots or voter‑verifiable records; some states rely on optical‑scan of hand‑marked ballots, others on ballot‑marking devices or VVPATs tied to electronic tabulators ^{[4] [5]}. Verified Voting’s cataloging shows that hand counting remains more common in very small jurisdictions (under 1,000 voters) while larger jurisdictions typically use optical‑scan tabulation ^[5]. Reporting also notes that some counties in Arkansas, California, Nevada and South Dakota used paper‑based hand counting or scanning, illustrating that within‑state variation persists ^[5].

3. How comprehensive was the paper adoption — National percentages versus local exceptions

Two programmatic assessments put the nationwide figure high: the Brennan Center and policy explainers estimated that between 95% and about 98% of ballots cast in 2024 had a paper record, a figure meant to convey near‑universality but not absolute uniformity ^{[1] [2] [3]}. These same sources caution that a few counties and limited jurisdictions remained without a durable paper trail, with specific mentions of some Louisiana and Texas counties lacking paper records or relying on VVPAT‑less equipment, though these outliers accounted for a small fraction of total votes ^[3]. The practical implication is that while paper was the default across the country, operational differences and local exceptions still mattered for audit design and public messaging ^{[1] [3]}.

4. The methodological debate — Hand counts, machines and what "paper" actually means

Sources emphasize that "paper ballot" encompasses a range of systems: hand‑marked ballots counted by optical scanners, ballots produced by ballot‑marking devices with voter review, and paper audit trails produced by touchscreen machines. Each method brings tradeoffs: hand‑marked optical scan ballots are promoted as the gold standard for voter intent and auditability, while ballot‑marking devices increase accessibility but raise questions about whether the printed ballot perfectly reflects the voter’s selections ^{[4] [5]}. Verified Voting’s data shows hand counts are more prevalent in tiny jurisdictions, which affects scalability of post‑election audits, while larger jurisdictions depend on scanning and risk‑limited audits ^[5].

5. Sources, framing and gaps — Who’s reporting and what they emphasize

The picture is drawn primarily from election‑security nonprofits and state equipment trackers; Brennan Center and Verified Voting provide interpretive frameworks emphasizing security and auditability, while Ballotpedia compiles equipment inventories and state policy changes ^{[1] [4] [5]}. Policy explainers from bipartisan centers present similar aggregate numbers but stop short of exhaustive lists of every county ^[2]. These sources serve different agendas: advocacy groups highlight security gains, trackers focus on equipment facts, and policy briefs stress systemic safeguards. Importantly, no single public dataset in the provided material lists every jurisdiction’s exact 2024 method, leaving room for localized exceptions and the need to consult state