What concrete steps would Russia have needed to take to join NATO in 2000, and did it meet any of them?

1. What concrete steps did NATO require in practice in 2000?

NATO’s founding treaty explicitly allows “any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty” to join, but that invitation is implemented through a process in which a prospective member first makes its wish known, then works with Allies—frequently through an individualized Membership Action Plan (MAP)—to demonstrate democratic governance, civilian control of the military, interoperability, and the ability to contribute to collective defence, before unanimous Alliance approval and ratification by member states ^{[1] [2]}.

2. Formal and informal preconditions: applications, MAPs, and ratification

By 1999 NATO had formalized MAPs as the standard route for aspirants and was candid that membership decisions ultimately rest with Allies and require consensus and national ratifications; NATO also emphasized adequate infrastructure on new members’ territory and adaptation of relevant arms control arrangements as part of a stable enlargement process ^{[2] [4] [1]}.

3. What Russia had already done that resembled those steps

Russia was not outside NATO’s institutional orbit: it joined Partnership for Peace in the mid‑1990s, signed the 1997 NATO‑Russia Founding Act to create a new relationship, contributed troops to NATO‑led missions such as in Bosnia, and held early high‑level negotiations in which leaders, including Putin, signalled openness to closer integration with the West ^{[4] [6] [3] [7]}.

4. Where Russia failed to meet concrete accession expectations

Despite rhetoric, Moscow never filed a formal membership application or entered the MAP process—Putin reportedly wanted membership but rejected “standing in line” and the usual application procedures, a stance NATO leaders recalled ^{[8] [3]}. Russia also did not carry out pledges tied to European security adaptations—Moscow had agreed in related negotiations to withdraw forces from Moldova and to close bases in Georgia by specified deadlines but failed to complete those steps by 2000–2002, undermining trust on arms control and force posture matters ^[5]. NATO’s officials and documents also stressed that Russia had no veto over enlargement and that Allies would judge any candidate’s democratic and defence reforms—an implicit benchmark Russia did not pursue in a transparent, MAP‑style process ^{[1] [2]}.

5. Politics, perceptions and the “special treatment” problem

The debate was never only technical: Western policymakers and experts debated whether granting Russia special status would reshape NATO’s identity, and Russia’s own demand for treatment “as an equal partner” outside the normal accession queue created a political impasse; Allies were reluctant to redefine the Alliance for one giant neighbor, and Russia’s insistence on bypassing MAP norms fed Allied concerns about reciprocity and standards ^{[8] [9] [6]}.

6. Bottom line — did Russia meet the concrete steps in 2000?

In concrete terms, Russia met some preparatory and cooperative prerequisites—partnership mechanisms, a Founding Act, mission cooperation and high‑level diplomacy that signalled interest—but it did not complete the formal accession sequence: it never submitted an application, did not enter MAP scrutiny, and failed to implement some security commitments that NATO regarded as relevant to stable enlargement ^{[4] [3] [5] [2]}. Therefore, while a political argument existed on both sides about whether deeper accommodation was possible, Russia in 2000 had not fulfilled the documented procedural and trust‑building steps that NATO required for membership.