Fact check: What are the studies about trust in government?

Executive Summary: Public trust in government in the United States remains low but variable, with recent surveys showing modest increases from troughs in 2024 yet still hovering near historic post‑1960s lows; researchers attribute these patterns to political polarization, perceived corruption, economic and performance evaluations, and measurement challenges in the trust construct ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}. Different studies and time series analyses emphasize distinct drivers — short‑term events and partisan cues can shift survey percentages, while cross‑national and methodological work stresses the role of perceived voice, competence, and measurement framing in explaining why trust levels differ across polls and countries ^{[5] [4]}.

1. Why recent polls paint a cautious improvement — and why that may mislead readers: The Partnership for Public Service’s spring 2025 survey reports 33% of Americans trust the federal government, up from an estimated 23% in 2024 but close to 2022’s 35% level, signaling a rebound from a low year ^[1]. That headline improvement is meaningful as an empirical shift, yet it comes with strong partisan and perceptional caveats: the same dashboard indicates two‑thirds of respondents view government as corrupt and most see federal wastefulness, and Republicans in that survey reported higher trust than Democrats or independents ^[6]. These internal contradictions show aggregate percentages mask polarized attitudes — short‑term events, elite messaging, and differential subgroup movement can produce swings that look like recovery at the macro level while underlying distrust remains structurally entrenched.

2. Long‑term context: the erosion since the 1960s and stability near historic lows: Longitudinal work from Pew and academic time‑series analyses places current trust levels among the lowest in decades, tracing erosion to the late 1960s and subsequent fluctuations tied to scandals, economic downturns, and crime concerns ^{[3] [7]}. Pew’s synthesis finds only roughly two‑in‑ten Americans say they trust Washington to do what’s right most or all of the time, and notes modest recent gains but persistence of low baseline trust ^{[2] [3]}. This long‑run lens explains why modest year‑to‑year upticks should be seen against a backdrop of structural decline: short‑term poll improvements do not erase decades‑long trends shaped by institutional performance and publicized failures.

3. Drivers highlighted by research and commentators: economy, scandals, populism, and money in politics: Multiple analyses converge on a set of causal drivers. Time‑series research links declines to adverse economic perceptions, congressional scandals, and rising crime concerns ^[7]. Contemporary commentators and podcast interviews add populism, the influence of money in politics, and perceived corruption as amplifiers that erode institutional legitimacy and complicate recovery efforts ^[8]. The Partnership survey’s finding that 65% consider it “too risky” to give a single leader more power underscores how concerns about concentrated authority and corruption condition willingness to grant emergency powers, even when people express low institutional confidence ^[2].

4. Measurement matters: what surveys really capture when they ask “trust”: Cross‑national and methodological studies show that common trust questions intermix assessments of perceived competence and perceived motivation, and that political sophistication and question framing shift reported trust levels ^{[4] [9]}. The OECD’s 2024 driver survey shows that feeling one has a say in government actions predicts trust more strongly than demographic traits, indicating agency and voice often drive trust independently of socioeconomic status ^[5]. This body of work warns that poll percentages are not pure measures of an immutable attitudinal trait but outcomes of instrument design, national context, and respondents’ interpretive frames.

5. Reconciling divergent findings and implications for interpretation: The assembled evidence produces three consistent implications: first, recent upticks do not equal institutional rehabilitation because public perceptions of corruption and waste remain widespread ^{[1] [6]}. Second, drivers operate at multiple timescales — immediate political events and long‑term structural factors both shape trust ^{[7] [8]}. Third, methodological nuance changes conclusions: differences across Pew, Partnership, OECD, and academic studies reflect question wording, sampling, national focus, and analytic scope rather than contradiction alone ^{[2] [5] [4]}. For policymakers and analysts, this means using multiple measures, tracking subgroup shifts, and attending to avenues that increase perceived agency and competence to move the needle on trust.