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Fact check: How have Supreme Court rulings in 2019 and 2023 affected gerrymandering cases?
Executive Summary
The Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause removed federal courts from adjudicating claims of partisan gerrymandering, telling litigants to seek relief in state courts and legislatures, while the 2023 Moore v. Harper decision rejected the extreme independent‑state‑legislature theory but left a new, somewhat vague federal check on state‑court policing of election rules. Together the two rulings pushed the practical battleground for redistricting and gerrymandering disputes into state institutions while creating a complicated interplay between state courts, state political branches, and federal review [1] [2] [3] [4].
1. How Rucho yanked partisan gerrymandering out of federal courts and why that mattered
In Rucho v. Common Cause (June 27, 2019), the Supreme Court held that claims of partisan gerrymandering are political questions beyond federal judicial reach, reversing lower-court rulings that had struck down extreme maps, such as North Carolina’s 2016 congressional plan. The majority explained that no judicially manageable standard existed to measure partisan harm and that the Constitution does not compel proportional representation or prescribe a single method for drawing districts; therefore federal courts must defer to the political process [2] [1]. The ruling did not endorse partisan gerrymanders as constitutional; rather it signaled that remedies must come from state constitutions, legislatures, independent commissions, or Congress. This decision immediately shifted litigation, reform efforts, and political energy into the states, prompting a proliferation of state constitutional and statutory claims as advocates sought alternative legal avenues [1] [2].
2. Moore’s rejection of the extreme theory, but the new federal safety valve
Moore v. Harper [5] emphatically rejected the most sweeping version of the independent‑state‑legislature theory, which had threatened to bar state courts from reviewing state-law constraints on how state legislatures regulate federal elections. The Court affirmed that state courts do have authority to interpret state election law and check state political branches, preserving a core avenue for challenging partisan mapmaking in many states [4]. Yet the decision also articulated a federal‑court standard permitting intervention where state-court decisions “transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review,” creating an imprecise back‑stop that could be invoked to limit state-court remedies in federal elections. This dual outcome bolsters state-court jurisdiction while inserting a potential federal override when federal courts find state-court interpretations to be extreme [3] [4].
3. What happened in the trenches: litigation, reforms, and state courts as the new front line
After Rucho, plaintiffs and reformers pivoted to state constitutions, state statutes, and independent redistricting commissions to challenge maps and change rules, yielding a wave of state-level decisions and reforms. The practical consequence was that some states produced robust anti‑gerrymandering rulings under state constitutional provisions, while others saw partisan legislatures double down on mapmaking. Moore’s preservation of state-court authority validated this strategy by confirming that state courts can police state-law limits on election regulation, but the decision’s vague federal restraint created uncertainty about the durability of some state-court victories in federal contexts. The combined effect is a patchwork of state outcomes, with reform victories in some jurisdictions and entrenchment in others, making the geographic distribution of remedy as consequential as the legal doctrine itself [1] [3].
4. The tug‑of‑war: federal abstention vs. conditional federal oversight
Rucho established a clear doctrine of federal abstention from partisan-gerrymandering claims, while Moore carved out a conditional path for federal courts to intervene if state courts meaningfully exceeded judicial bounds. This produces a legal tension: federal courts refuse to police partisan intent broadly, yet reserve a fuzzy authority to overturn state-court actions that impinge on federal election regulation. The practical upshot is strategic: challengers will continue to file in state courts where doctrinal tools are available and political contexts may be more favorable, but actors seeking to preserve partisan maps may invoke Moore to seek federal review if state courts issue sweeping remedial rulings. The result is a fragmented doctrine that amplifies the role of state legal texts and state judicial philosophy in determining whether and how gerrymandering is remedied [1] [4].
5. What this means going forward: politics, law, and the importance of state institutions
Taken together, Rucho [6] and Moore [5] make state institutions decisive battlegrounds for redistricting reform; state constitutions, statutes, commissions, and courts now determine much of the fate of partisan gerrymanders. Rucho’s federal retreat pushed change into those venues, and Moore’s rejection of the extreme independent‑state‑legislature doctrine preserved that state‑level pathway while adding an uncertain federal safety valve. The combined jurisprudence means advocates and legislatures will continue to pursue local legal and policy fixes, but the uneven state landscape and the potential for federal review in edge cases will keep gerrymandering litigation strategically complex and politically consequential for the foreseeable future [2] [3].