They promised jazira and kobani to turkey

1. What the agreement actually contained, in plain terms

The public text and reporting around the post-ceasefire arrangements spell out concrete measures: individual integration of SDF fighters into Syrian armed structures, an obligation to expel non‑Syrian PKK-affiliated members from Syrian territory, and a specific provision for the “demilitarisation of Kobani,” alongside promises about returns to Afrin and other areas ^[1]. Those clauses directly echo long-standing Turkish redlines — removal of PKK influence and the neutralisation of Kurdish armed capacity along its border — but they stop short in the available reporting of saying “we transfer sovereignty/territory to Turkey” ^[1].

2. How Ankara has interpreted and reacted to those clauses

Turkey framed the deal as a “historic turning point” and a validation of its security priorities: senior Turkish officials welcomed provisions removing PKK elements and Ankara’s political leadership publicly described the arrangements as critical for restoring state authority and eliminating “terrorism” from Syrian territory ^{[2] [1]}. President Erdoğan and other Turkish ministries expressed readiness to support Damascus against the SDF if “dialogue” failed, signaling that Ankara sees the agreement as advancing its leverage and security interests ^[1].

3. Kurdish and SDF responses — accusations and red lines

Kurdish leaders and the SDF have not treated the package as equivalent to handing over territory; instead they have framed parts of the accord as coercive concessions and warned that Kobani and Jazira remain red lines for their defense, even while the SDF reported ceasefire violations in Jazira and Kobani and called on guarantors to intervene ^[1]. Local reporting from Kobani describes an atmosphere of siege and fear given the city’s history and recent offensives, reinforcing Kurdish skepticism that their autonomy has been bought off ^{[3] [4]}.

4. The historical and geopolitical context that shapes interpretations

The Jazira has long been contested in historical boundary politics and is a fertile center of Kurdish, Arab and tribal claims; appeals to its strategic and symbolic value predate the civil war and feed current narratives about who “deserves” the territory ^[5]. Ankara’s posture toward northern Syria has alternated between direct intervention and diplomatic pressure, and analysts note that Turkey’s endgame is less about formal annexation than establishing security depth and removing PKK influence — objectives reflected in the deal’s wording ^{[6] [7]}.

5. What is not in the reporting — an important limit

None of the supplied sources assert that Damascus or the guarantor states issued a formal legal transfer or explicit concession of Jazira and Kobani to Turkish sovereignty; the record instead shows provisions that reduce Kurdish military autonomy and satisfy Turkish security aims, alongside Turkish declarations that treat the arrangement as a strategic victory ^{[1] [2]}. Where sources diverge, Kurdish actors portray the terms as forced and dangerous for local populations, while Ankara frames them as legitimacy for its security stance ^{[1] [3]}.

6. Bottom line — promise or pragmatic convergence?

The available reporting supports a conclusion that Ankara secured elements of what it wanted — demilitarisation of Kobani, removal of PKK‑linked fighters, and integration of SDF personnel in a way that dilutes autonomous Kurdish command — and that Turkey publicly treats the outcome as effectively serving its interests, but there is no documented, formal promise in these sources that Jazira or Kobani were handed wholesale to Turkey as sovereign territory ^{[1] [2] [5]}. The story is therefore one of negotiated concessions and shifting control on the ground rather than a legal cession of land.