What is the total number of civilian casualties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 2020?

1. Why a single, agreed total doesn’t exist — competing sources and definitions

Different institutions count differently: UN OCHA compiles casualties in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel using categories tied to the occupation context and excludes some incident types, while Gaza’s Ministry of Health reports overall deaths in Gaza without separating combatant and civilian status; independent monitors and Israeli military data also offer competing breakdowns ^{[1] [2] [4]}. These definitional differences—who is a “civilian,” whether battlefield combatant lists are trusted, and whether deaths from secondary causes (illness, rubble) are included—make a universal total unattainable from the available reporting ^{[1] [2] [4]}.

2. Baselines through 2020 and how they shift after Oct. 7, 2023

Longstanding trackers like OCHA and aggregated charts (via Statista) documented thousands of Palestinian deaths and many more injuries through 2020—for example, OCHA’s datasets cover fatalities and injuries since 2008 and Statista reported 5,600 Palestinian deaths up to 2020 as a summarized figure based on OCHA data ^{[1] [5]}. Those pre‑2021 baselines were dwarfed by the mass casualties of the 2023–25 war, after which Gaza health authorities and other trackers reported death tolls in the tens of thousands ^{[5] [2]}.

3. The post‑2023 surge: numbers reported by Gaza health authorities and other compilations

Gaza’s Health Ministry reported that more than 55,000 Palestinians had been killed by mid‑June 2025; that tally does not distinguish civilians from combatants, though the ministry said women and children made up over half of the dead in earlier statements ^{[2] [6]}. Compilations cited by Statista and other outlets put Palestinian deaths from Israeli retaliation at roughly 61,158 and Israeli deaths from the Oct. 7 attacks at about 1,200, with thousands of injuries on both sides—figures that reflect different collection methods and cutoffs ^[3].

4. Disagreement over civilian vs. combatant attribution

A central dispute is how many of those killed were combatants versus civilians. Independent reporting and leaked Israeli military data suggested a very high civilian share—one analysis of an IDF database indicated up to 83% civilian rate in Gaza as of mid‑2025, while Gaza‑side tallies often do not distinguish categories and Israel disputes some counts ^{[4] [2]}. Human Rights Watch and other monitors emphasize civilian tolls and note many deaths from indirect causes may not be captured in certain datasets ^[7].

5. Secondary casualties, injuries, and regional spillover complicate the math

Beyond Gaza and Israel, conflict‑related deaths and injuries have occurred in the West Bank, Lebanon, and elsewhere; Statista noted West Bank deaths into 2025 and OCHA tracks Gaza/West Bank/Israel contexts separately ^{[3] [1]}. Human Rights Watch and media outlets also flag that figures often undercount those who die later from wounds, disease, or under rubble—factors that widen any credible casualty range ^[7].

6. What a cautious answer looks like right now

Given the sources provided: pre‑2021 datasets from OCHA and summaries (e.g., 5,600 Palestinian deaths up to 2020) provide the baseline ^{[1] [5]}. From October 2023 through mid‑2025, Gaza health authorities reported more than 55,000 Palestinian deaths and other compilations cite roughly 61,000 Palestinian deaths linked to Israeli operations and about 1,200 Israeli deaths from the Oct. 7 attacks—however, these tallies overlap, use distinct methods, and do not converge on a single civilian‑only total ^{[2] [3] [6]}. Available sources do not mention a definitive, consolidated “total number of civilian casualties since 2020.”

Limitations: I rely only on the provided sources; more recent or alternative tallies (e.g., later UN updates, aggregated NGO databases, or finalized post‑conflict audits) are not in this set. Where sources disagree, I present both figures and the underlying methodological reason for the divergence ^{[1] [2] [4]}.